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THE REAL AND ILLUSORY CHANGES OF
THE 1977 MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT
Samuel Green
and
John V Long*
The evolution of divorce law in the District of Columbia, from the his-
torical common law fault grounds of adultery and desertion to the statu-
tory no-fault grounds set forth in the 1977 Marriage and Divorce Act,'
presents an impressive history of liberalization reflecting the ever changing
marital and sexual mores of our society. Until 1935, for example, the guilty
party in an adultery divorce case was not allowed to remarry.2 With the
elimination of this punitive fault provision and the introduction in that
same year of the first no-fault concept of voluntary separation, 3 the statu-
tory changes in the subsequent forty-two years have also resulted in a con-
siderable expansion of the number of divorce grounds. The recently
enacted District of Columbia Marriage and Divorce Act not only conforms
to this trend, but significantly alters certain other areas of existing law. For
example, final divorce has become easier to obtain, and the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia has been given broader jurisdiction to enable it
to make a fair and equitable distribution of property. But, perhaps con-
trary to the drafters' intentions, some areas of the law have undergone
little change. The custody criteria set out in detail for the first time in the
new law represent little modification in long-established principles. Simi-
larly, the "relevant factors" a court must consider in distributing property,
established in the 1977 amendments, are no more than a codification of the
case law of this jurisdiction. In fact, the only real change in the property
* Samuel Green is the Chairperson of the Family Law Division of the District of Co-
lumbia Bar. John V. Long is the Chairperson of the Domestic Relations Committee of the
Bar Association of the District of Columbia. The authors acknowledge assistance from Mr.
Green's wife, Judge Joyce Hens Green, and Manuel A. Palau, a student at Catholic Univer-
sity Law School.
1. D.C. Law 1-107 (1977). This Act was originally introduced as Bill 1-89 in the Council
of the District of Columbia.
2. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 966 (1902).
3. See Act of Aug. 7, 1935, ch. 453, § 1, 49 Stat. 539.
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distribution area has been to give the courts the power to distribute solely-
owned property.
This article will review the history of statutory and case law in the Dis-
trict of Columbia since the first statute was enacted in 1860. In addition, it
will examine and evaluate each of the 1977 provisions and review what, if
any, changes have been wrought thereby. As will be seen, in many areas
the prior case law can be expected to continue as controlling precedent
even under the 1977 law.4
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF D.C. LAW 1-107
The District of Columbia Marriage and Divorce Act, as originally intro-
duced by District of Columbia City Councilmember Arrington Dixon on
May 6, 1975,5 was based in large part on the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act advocated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. 6 In order to gain the advantages of a uniform statu-
tory scheme in all states adopting the so-called "no-fault" divorce law, the
proposed legislation, Bill No. 1-89, was initially intended to completely
supplant Title 16, Chapter 9, of the District of Columbia Code.7 This legis-
lation would have replaced all of the existing grounds for divorce, such as
adultery, desertion, voluntary separation, and conviction of a felony, with
a single ground: the "irretrievable breakdown" of the marriage. Under the
"irretrievable breakdown" concept of divorce which has now been adopted
in thirty-one states,8 if both parties assert that a breakdown has occurred,
the court, after a hearing, is required to "make a finding whether the mar-
4. The Anti-Sex Discriminatory Language Act, D.C. Law 1-87 (1976), as well as the
District of Columbia Marriage and Divorce Act, D.C. Law 1-107 (1977), effected modifica-
tions in legitimacy and paternity law. See D.C. Code §§ 16-907 to 16-909, 19-316 (1973).
This area is the subject of additional proposed amendments now before the Council of the
District of Columbia. This article will not discuss this subject since it involves extensive
problems which merit separate treatment.
5. Seminar Coursebook, 1977 Family Law Seminar, The New District of Columbia
Marriage and Divorce Act (Mar. 31, 1977) (not paginated) (available from Seminar Sec'y,
1231 25th St., N.W., Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as Coursebook].
6. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (1973 version). Bill 1-89 contained certain
modifications of the Uniform Act, such as the broad definition of marriage as between "two
persons," publication requirements in informapauperis cases, etc.. Coursebook, supra note
5. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides inter alia for a single "irretrievable
breakdown of marriage" ground for divorce, allows for a property distribution of assets
which belong to either or both parties, however and whenever acquired, and sets certain
guidelines for maintenance and custody determinations. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND Di-
VORCE ACT §§ 305, 307, 308, 310 (1973 version).
7. Letter from Arrington Dixon to David Clarke, Chairperson, Committee on the Judi-
ciary and Criminal Law (Oct. 7, 1975) reprinted in Coursebook, supra note 5.
8. 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001 (1977).
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riage is irretrievably broken."9 If one party disagrees, the court would ei-
ther hold a hearing to consider all factors relevant to reconciliation in
order to determine whether the marriage is broken or would schedule a
hearing to be held sixty days later on the issue of whether there is an irre-
trievable breakdown. On its own initiative or at the request of either party,
the court could also order that a "conciliation conference" be held. In ad-
dition, the residency requirement for jurisdiction would have been reduced
from one year to six months.10
On July 7 and 8, 1975, attorneys, citizens, and representatives of various
civic organizations stated their views on Bill 1-89 at public hearings con-
ducted by the Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law. I Mr. Dixon
subsequently fashioned a "reprint bill" incorporating comments from the
public and attorneys, as well as technical amendments proposed by Dixon
himself during the hearings.' 2 Nevertheless, this revised version of the bill
was abandoned when members of the District of Columbia Bar and the
Bar Association of the District of Columbia alerted Mr. Dixon to the prac-
tical incongruities that would have resulted from the complete repeal and
replacement of the current divorce law.' 3 Also, many practicing lawyers,
including those who favored adoption of a "no-fault" ground, disliked the
"irretrievable breakdown" concept. Dixon responded by proposing the
amendment of selected sections of the present code. 14
On October 7, 1975, an alternative bill reflecting this new approach was
suggested by a joint committee of the Bar Association of the District of
Columbia and the District of Columbia Bar, co-chaired by the authors of
this article. During informal discussions at joint meetings of the two bar
groups and at later hearings on the new legislation, some lawyers argued
that retention of the traditional fault grounds was desirable to protect the
"innocent" spouse by giving that spouse bargaining power in property and
support negotiations. It was argued, for example, that this language was
9. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 305 (1973 version).
10. D.C. Code § 16-902 (1973).
11. Report from David Clarke to City Council Members (June 24, 1976) reprinted in
Coursebook, supra note 5. Among the organizations represented at the hearings were: Na-
tional Organization of Women, Family Division of the D.C. Bar, Parents Without Partners,
D.C. Commission on the Status of Women, Metropolitan Community Church, Gay Activ-
ists Alliance, and Neighborhood Legal Services. Coursebook, supra note 5.
12. See Memorandum from Arrington Dixon to David Clarke (Aug. 1, 1975) reprinted in
Coursebook, supra note 5.
13. See Letter from Arrington Dixon, supra note 7; H. Zuckman, Guide to the New D.C.
Marriage and Divorce Law, 1 DISTRICT LAW. 44 (1977). For example, the original Bill No.
1-89 would have eliminated, by mere oversight, all support for illegitimate children and all
temporary maintenance, except in divorce cases, by repealing D. C. Code § 16-916(a) with-
out supplying any replacement.
14. Letter from Arrington Dixon, supra note 7.
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justified, particularly when the innocent spouse was a wife who had been
out of the job market for years while raising her family and when the hus-
band had titled property accumulated during the marriage in his sole
name, thus putting it beyond reach of the divorce court. Other arguments
were raised on behalf of the innocent husband. This committee ultimately
produced a compromise revision of Title 16 drafted by attorneys Marsha
E. Swiss and Karen Classen Kucik and submitted to Councilmember
Dixon on April 19, 1976.' 5
The compromise proposal of the bar groups retained all existing so-
called "fault" grounds for divorce, but reduced the separation period for
voluntary separation from twelve to six months and added a new "no-
fault" ground of twelve months of separation without cohabitation. It also
reduced the residency requirement to six months. Furthermore, the bill
provided that separately titled property acquired during the marriage, ex-
cept by inheritance or gift, was subject to division by the divorce court, in
the same manner as joint property. This latter provision was regarded as
affording protection to the "innocent" spouse who was said to be losing the
bargaining effectiveness of the fault divorce grounds as a result of the new
no-fault ground.
On May 20, 1976, the Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law of
the Council held a "round table discussion" to deliberate the issues raised
by the original Bill 1-89.16 At this meeting, Mr. Dixon offered the com-
bined bar organizations' compromise proposal as a substitute for the origi-
nal bill. It was accepted as Title I of amended Bill No. 1-89 along with a
new Title II containing provisions for service of process on absent defend-
ants, indigent filing, and enforcement of support orders.' 7
This substitute bill underwent committee mark-up on June 15, 1976,
and was put to a final committee vote on June 23, 1976. It was passed on
the first reading by the City Council, but at an amended first reading'8 on
November 22, 1976, David H. Clarke introduced an amendment which
deleted adultery as a ground for absolute divorce, but retained it as a
15. See Letter from Marsha E. Swiss, Chairperson, D.C. Code and Court Rules Commit-
tee, Unified Bar, and John V. Long, Chairperson, Domestic Relations Committee, Bar Asso-
ciation of the District of Columbia, to Councilmember David Clarke (April 19, 1976).
16. See Memorandum from Gregory Mize, Staff Director, Committee on the Judiciary
and Criminal Law, to Members of the Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law, Staff
Issue Analysis Statement on Bill 1-89 (May 10, 1976). This memorandum contains the com-
ments made by the organizations listed in note 11 supra.
17. See Report from David Clarke, supra note 11.
18. Under the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 412(a), 87 Stat. 774 (1973), each proposed bill undergoes two
readings before the Council of the District of Columbia sends it to the mayor for a 10-day
review. In this particular instance, Bill 1-89 was amended at the first reading stage.
[Vol. 27:469
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ground for legal separation. Some representatives of the bar believed this
amendment contradicted the compromise agreement which had resulted in
a consensus of the bar groups behind the proposal, a compromise which
they felt had been accepted by Clarke.' 9 As a result, several of them op-
posed the bill after this deletion of the adultery ground for absolute di-
vorce. In explaining his unexpected amendment, Clarke stated that the
adultery ground should be retained to permit a legal separation, though
not an absolute divorce because he favored a delay before permitting an
application for absolute divorce. Although the amendment ultimately
passed, many practitioners did not consider Clarke's reasoning valid in
light of their experiences with adultery cases which were usually expensive
and time-consuming to prepare. Moreover, a judgment on this ground is
difficult to obtain because of the strict standards of proof.20 Also, there was
concern over the fact that since some religious groups only permit their
members to obtain absolute divorce on adultery grounds, their adherents
would be unable to obtain divorces under the District of Columbia law. In
any event, after a second reading and adoption on December 7, 1976,
Mayor Walter Washington signed the bill on January 4, 1977. The legisla-
tion was sent to both houses of Congress for the thirty day review period
required by the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental
Reorganization Act. 21 Upon expiration of this review period, the City
Council designated the enactment as D.C. Law 1-107, effective April 7,
1977.22
II. RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
The first statute in this jurisdiction dealing with residency requirements
for divorce, the Act of June 19, 1860,23 provided that no court could grant
a divorce for any cause occurring outside the District unless the party mak-
ing the application had resided in the jurisdiction for two years. This re-
quirement was clarified and augmented by a 1901 revision which flatly
19. This unwritten compromise was agreed upon by those members of the committee
who favored retention of fault grounds for divorce and those members who had favored no-
fault grounds. In essence, the pro-fault members agreed to support the substitute bill if a
second no-fault ground were added and adultery were retained as a fault ground (authors'
recollections).
20. As recently as 1959, adultery was a ground for divorce in every state, but was used in
less than 3% of all divorce cases. See H. CLARK THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 327-28 (1968).
21. Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 602(c), 87 Stat. 774 (1973).
22. Notice of April 13, 1977, Council of the District of Columbia. The Act was published
in 23 D.C. Reg. 5869 (Feb. 11, 1977).
23. Act of June 19, 1860, ch. 158, § 5, 12 Stat. 60; R.S.D.C. § 740 (Comp. St. D.C. 1894,
ch. 30, § 36).
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declared that no decree of divorce or nullity would issue unless the appli-
cant was a District of Columbia resident.2 4 Further, in 1901, the period of
residency was increased to at least three years prior to the date of applica-
tion for any cause occurring outside the District of Columbia prior to resi-
dence.25 The primary purpose of this residency requirement, as enunciated
by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in Creel v. Creel,26
was to avoid making the District an attractive haven for those seeking
quick divorces.27 The residency period was reduced to one year in 196528
to liberalize the divorce law and bring it into closer conformity with the
laws of Maryland and Virginia.2 9 In that same year, the Code was modi-
fied to provide jurisdiction if either the plaintiff or defendant met the resi-
dency requirement.30
The 1977 amendment, as finally enacted, reduces the one-year residency
requirement for divorce to six months.31 Consonant with the continuing
trend making divorce easier to obtain, this is virtually the only substantive
provision that appeared in both the original bill and the Bar proposal. In
24. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 971, 31 Stat. 1345.
25. Id. The statute has always required that the applicant be a "bona fide resident",
which the courts have interpreted to mean domiciliary. See, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 76 U.S.
App. D.C. 297, 130 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (bona fide residence means domicile); Rzes-
zotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1972) (requirements for establishing domicile
are physical presence and an intent to abandon former domicile and remain in this jurisdic-
tion indefinitely); Gullo v. Gullo, 192 A.2d 126 (D.C. 1963) (bona fide residence means
domicile); Downs v. Downs, 23 App. D.C. 381 (1904) (residence for the purpose of divorce
must be in good faith).
26. 43 App. D.C. 82 (1915).
27. This purpose has been echoed in subsequent decisions despite the gradual reduction
of the residency period. See Bottomley v. Bottomley, 104 U.S. App. D.C. 311, 262 F.2d 23
(D.C. Cir. 1958); Orlans v. Orlans, 99 U.S. App. D.C. 170, 238 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Dennett v. Dennett, 63 App. D.C. 252, 71 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
28. Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-217, § 1, 79 Stat. 889.
29. 111 CONG. REC. 21,680 (1965). In 1965, both Maryland and Virginia had one-year
residency requirements for causes arising outside the jurisdiction. The conformity with
neighboring states was so desired that the Senate rejected the six-month residency period
which originally had passed in the House. Id.
30. A series of cases have held that "residence" under § 16-902 of the District of Colum-
bia Code means domicile. See, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 297, 130 F.2d 905
(D.C. Cir. 1942) (discussing § 16-401, a precursor of § 16-902). Cf Rzeszotarski v. Rzes-
zotarski, 296 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1972) and Alves v. Alves, 262 A.2d Ill (D.C. 1970) (non-
citizens were found domiciled in the District of Columbia). These District of Columbia
precedents are in accord with the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (divorce jurisdiction is based upon common law con-
cepts of domicile, for purposes of full faith and credit under the United States Constitution).
31. "No action for divorce or legal separation shall be maintainable unless one of the
parties to the marriage has been a bona fide resident of the District of Columbia for at least
six months next preceding the commencement of the action." D.C. Law 1-107 (1977)
(amending D.C. Code § 16-902 (1973)).
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addition, the new law provides for jurisdiction when a member of the
armed services stationed in the District of Columbia meets the six-month
residency requirement.32 In effect, this provision overrules prior case law
which held that the courts lacked jurisdiction when a resident member of
the armed forces was domiciled elsewhere. 33
III. GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
The District of Columbia Code provides for two types of divorce. Abso-
lute divorce, or divorce a vinculo matrimonii, results in a complete dissolu-
tion of the bond of marriage, thus creating the legal status of a single
person for both husband and wife.34 On the other hand, a legal separation,
known as a limited divorce or divorce a mensa et thoro, keeps the marriage
status intact but gives legal effect to the actual separation of the parties
from bed and board. When the court issues such a decree, it retains juris-
diction over the parties and the matter remains open for a possible decree
of absolute divorce in the future.35 It should be noted, however, that courts
in the District of Columbia have not always had the power to issue both
types of decrees. Prior to 1860, courts only had the authority to grant de-
crees for legal separation and for alimony. 36 There was no authority to
grant a final divorce decree until passage of the Act of June 19, 1860,3 7
which gave District of Columbia courts the power to grant absolute di-
vorces as well as divorces from bed and board for enumerated causes. The
statutory grounds for divorce a vinculo matrimonii were limited to: adul-
tery, lunacy or impotency of either party, and marriage which was entered
into while either party had a former spouse living.38 The grounds for di-
vorce a mensa et thoro, or legal separation, included cruelty, which endan-
gers life or health, reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, and desertion
for three consecutive years. 39 The number of grounds for divorce a vinculo
matrimonii was expanded in 1870 to include cruel treatment endangering
life or health, desertion for two consecutive years, and habitual drunken-
32. "If a member of the armed forces of the United States resides in the District of Co-
lumbia for a continuous period of six months during his or her period of military service, he
or she shall be deemed to reside in the District of Columbia for purposes of this section
only." D.C. Law 1-107 (1977) (amending D.C. Code § 16-902 (1973)).
33. See Stephenson v. Stephenson, 134 A.2d 105 (D.C. 1957).
34. See, e.g., Maschaur v. Maschaur, 23 App. D.C. 87 (1904).
35. Id.
36. Cheever v. Wilson, 6 D.C. (1 Mackey) 149, rev'd on other groundg 76 U.S. (9 Wall)
108 (1866); Hatfield v. Hatfield, 6 D.C. (1 Mackey) 80 (1864).
37. Act of June 19, 1860, ch. 158, §§ 4,5; 12 Stat. 59, 60; R.S.D.C. §§ 738, 739 (Comp. St.
D.C. 1894, ch. 30, §§ 34, 35.
38. Act of June 19, 1860, supra note 37, at § 3.
39. Id at § 4.
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ness for three years.40 The supplemental cruelty and desertion grounds
were apparently borrowed from the existing grounds for divorce a mensa et
thoro.
The next revision of the law in 1901 resulted in a drastic cutback in the
number of grounds available for divorce a.4 All causes for full divorce were
eliminated with the exception of adultery, while the grounds for legal sepa-
ration remained intact. In trimming back the law, Congress was respond-
ing to complaints from various sectors of society that prior statutes made
divorce too readily available. District of Columbia Supreme Court Justices
and the United States Attorney, as well as numerous religious leaders, had
condemned the existing law as too lax.4 2 The new statute was seen as a
moral and social benefit to the District of Columbia since its intent was to
improve the law and bring it into conformity with the "highest grade" of
divorce law found elsewhere in the states.4 3 In keeping with this moral
climate, a further provision was added stating that only the innocent party
was allowed to remarry after a divorce based on adultery. 4
In 1935, Congress reexamined the divorce laws and concluded that they
were too stringent. Consequently, the 1935 Act4 5 was passed to broaden
and liberalize the District's divorce law by adding three more grounds for
divorce to supplement the existing adultery ground. The new grounds
were: desertion for two years; conviction of a felony involving moral turpi-
tude and carrying a partly served sentence of not less than two years to a
penal institution; and voluntary separation from bed and board for five
consecutive years without cohabitation.4 6 With the enactment of this vol-
untary separation provision, the District of Columbia received its first no-
fault divorce ground. The significance of the no-fault concept was ex-
plained by Chief Judge Hood of the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals in his opinion in Davis v. Davis:4 7
When our divorce law was amended in 1935 to include five
years voluntary separation as a ground for divorce, it made possi-
ble that parties to a marriage could put an end to the marriage by
40. Act of June 1, 1870, ch. 116, 16 Stat. 147.
41. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 966, 31 Stat. 1345.
42. See S. Doc. No. 174, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1901).
43. Id. at 4. By "highest grade," Congress meant to emulate those states such as New
York which recognized only adultery as a ground for divorce. Id. Another reason for the
change was the desired uniformity with divorce legislation in other states. At that time a
uniform law on marriage and divorce was anticipated. Such uniformity, however, never
came into being.
44. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, supra note 41, at § 966.
45. Act of Aug. 7, 1935, ch. 453, § 1, 49 Stat. 539.
46. D.C. Code § 16-403 (1940).
47. 191 A.2d 138 (D.C. 1963).
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their own voluntary action and after the required period either
party could have the marriage legally dissolved. In such a disso-
lution proceeding there is no question of the innocence or guilt of
either party and the reason for the separation is not material. The
only issue is the existence of the voluntary separation for the re-
quired time.48
Adoption of a no-fault concept was clearly an important step toward the
liberalization of District of Columbia divorce law.
The next notable change did not occur until 1965, when Congress set-
tled on the following grounds for divorce: (1) adultery, (2) actual or con-
structive desertion for one year, (3) voluntary separation from bed and
board for one year without cohabitation, and (4) final felony conviction
with sentence of not less than two years to a penal institution which is
served in whole or in part.49 As in the prior law, the grounds for a legal
separation included the four grounds for final divorce and the same fifth
ground, cruelty. Basically, the effect of this revision was to reduce the pe-
riod of desertion from two years to one year and the period of voluntary
separation from five years to one year.50 The change was made because the
law had remained the same since 1935 and Congress wanted to bring the
District of Columbia divorce statutes into closer harmony with the provi-
sions in the adjoining jurisdictions of Maryland and Virginia. 51
The 1977 amendments have now removed all "fault" grounds for abso-
lute divorce from the D.C. Code. As a result, parties can no longer secure a
divorce based on adultery, desertion, or the conviction of a felony. The
voluntary separation no-fault ground has been retained in a modified
form, and a second no-fault ground has been added:
A divorce from the bonds of marriage may be granted if:
(1) both parties to the marriage have mutually and voluntari-
ly lived separate and apart without cohabitation for a period of
six months next preceding commencement of the action;
(2) both parties to the marriage have lived separate and apart
without cohabitation for a period of one year next preceding
commencement of the action.52
48. Id at 139.
49. Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-217, § 2, 79 Stat. 889. A 1963 revision provided
only minor changes in phraseology. Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat.
560.
50. This is also reflected in the time requirement involved in enlarging a decree of di-
vorce a mensa el thoro into a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, which was also reduced from two
years to one. Act of Sept. 29, 1965, supra note 49, at § 2.
51. See H.R. REP. No. 24, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965); S. REP. No. 638, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1965).
52. D.C. Code § 16-904 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 102 (1977).
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Thus, the period of voluntary separation required under the amended di-
vorce law has been reduced from one year to six months. Under prior case
law, the complaining party was required to establish that the separation
was mutually voluntary for the statutory period.3 Obviously, this require-
ment is not eliminated under the new amendments. What is significant,
however, is that the creation of the new twelve month separation ground
does not impose any requirement of either voluntariness or mutuality. This
means that would-be plaintiffs who are unable to establish that the separa-
tion was voluntary on the part of the defendant are no longer barred from
securing a no-fault divorce based upon separation without cohabitation.
Further, this amendment obviates the need for potential plaintiffs to move
their residence to Virginia in order to make use of that jurisdiction's no-
fault provision, now that the District of Columbia and Virginia have virtu-
ally identical twelve-month separation without cohabitation grounds for
divorce.54 The comparable ground in Maryland requires three years of
separation.55
At this point, it is unclear whether plaintiffs seeking divorce under the
new twelve month separation ground will have to make any kind of show-
ing as to the intended nature of the separation. Although it is not necessary
to show voluntariness under the twelve month ground, District courts may
follow their Virginia counterparts and require an intention on the part of
at least one party to separate permanently at the time the separation oc-
curred to trigger the running of the one year period.56 In Hooker v.
Hooker,57 a husband was transferred to South Vietnam as a civilian em-
ployee of the United States Army. After nearly two years of continuous
separation from his wife and family, he instructed a Richmond attorney to
institute divorce proceedings against his wife based on Virginia's separa-
tion without cohabitation ground.58 The Virginia Circuit Court held that
Hooker was not entitled to a divorce under this provision since there was
no expressed intent by him to separate, nor had he undertaken any actions
53. See Martin v. Martin, 82 U.S. App. D.C. 40, 160 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Seabrook
v. Seabrook, 264 A.2d 311 (D.C. 1970); Glendenning v. Glendenning, 206 A.2d 824 (D.C.
1965).
54. The Virginia statute provides in part: "A divorce from the bond of matrimony may
be decreed: ... [o]n the application of either party if and when the husband and wife have
lived separate and apart without any cohabitation and without interruption for one year."
VA. CODE § 20-91(9)(a) (1975).
55. MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 24 (1973).
56. See Hooker v. Hooker, 215 Va. 415, 211 S.E.2d 34 (1975).
57. Id.
58. Id. At that time, the separation period was two years. See VA. CODE § 20-91(9)
(Cum. Supp. 1974).
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from which such intent could be implied.59 The Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed, stating that the statutory concept of living separate and apart
meant more than mere physical separation:
In our view, the General Assembly intended that the separation
be coupled with an intention on the part of at least one of the
parties to live separate and apart permanently, and that this in-
tention must be shown to have been present at the beginning of
the uninterrupted two year period of living separate and apart
without any cohabitation. 60
The Court voiced a fear that without the intent requirement, many situa-
tions requiring extended absences might ripen into "instant divorces," thus
precluding any contemplation of or attempts at reconciliation. Accord-
ingly, under Hooker, a trial separation period would neither trigger the
running of Virginia's no-fault period nor count as part of the one year
separation period since there would be no intent to separate permanently
at the inception of the trial separation. Such rulings may serve as impor-
tant precedents in the District of Columbia.
The 1977 amendments have also provided the following guidelines to
aid in the determination of whether an alleged separation by spouses will
suffice as grounds for divorce under the new statute: "[P]arties who have
pursued separate lives, sharing neither bed nor board, shall be deemed to
have lived separate and apart from one another even though: (1) they re-
side under the same roof; or (2) the separation is pursuant to an order of a
court."'6 1 This provision is little more than a codification of the "separate
lives" doctrine first enunciated in Boyce v. Boyce62 and later reaffirmed in
Hurd v. Hurd.63 In both Boyce and Hurd, the spouses continued to occupy
different parts of the same abode but neither took meals nor engaged in
any social life together. The courts emphasized that the "essential thing is
not separate roofs, but separate lives." 64 In contrast, this doctrine has been
expressly rejected in Maryland by the Court of Special Appeals. In Jack-
son v. Jackson,65 that court required that the parties live in completely
separate abodes. The husband had resided on a separate floor from his
disabled wife and had testified that they lived separate lives in different
59. 215 Va. at 416, 211 S.E.2d at 36. The only evidence relating to the intent behind the
separation indicated that Hooker had taken the overseas job in order to earn a higher salary.
In addition, Hooker had sent his wife varying sums of money during the entirety of the
separation period in order to pay for support, education, and mortgage expenses. Id.
60. 215 Va. at 417, 211 S.E.2d at 36.
61. D.C. Code § 16-904 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 102 (1977).
62. 80 U.S. App. D.C. 355, 153 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
63. 86 U.S. App. D.C. 62, 179 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
64. 80 U.S. App. D.C. at 356, 153 F.2d at 230.
65. 13 Md. App. 725, 284 A.2d 654 (1971).
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parts of the house. He had remained there to be near his children and to
assist his critically ill wife, but had no intention of continuing the mar-
riage.66 The Council of District of Columbia has rejected the Jackson ap-
proach and has incorporated the "separate lives" doctrine into the new
code. Despite this codification, it is likely that the District of Columbia
courts will continue to scrutinize carefully cases of separation under the
same roof before dissolving marriages under this provision when the cases
involve close facts.
The new divorce law has also modified the grounds for a legal separa-
tion, resulting in two "no-fault separation without cohabitation" grounds
and two fault grounds. The first no-fault ground provides that a "legal
separation from bed and board may be granted if both parties to the mar-
riage have mutually and voluntarily lived separate and apart without co-
habitation. '67 Significantly, this section allows a suit for limited divorce to
be filed immediately upon the occurrence of the voluntary separation. No
time period is specified in the statute and apparently none is required as
long as the separation can be shown to be mutually voluntary, continuous,
and without cohabitation. Because of its advantage of allowing immediate
filing, this ground may be used for a number of reasons, such as imminent
absence from the jurisdiction, and as a basis for supplemental relief in-
cluding injunctions, temporary support, and custody. The second no-fault
ground provides for limited divorce when "both parties to the marriage
have lived separate and apart without cohabitation for a period of one year
next preceding the commencement of the action."'68 Similar to the new
twelve month separation ground for absolute divorce, this section may be
used by plaintiffs when the separation was not mutually voluntary or when
such voluntariness may be difficult to establish. 69 Unlike the voluntary
separation provision, a suit for legal separation on this ground may not be
filed until expiration of twelve months.
Two fault grounds for legal separation have been retained: adultery and
cruelty.70 While this seems anomalous in view of the fact that all fault
grounds for absolute divorce were stricken from the Code, it does allow for
66. This rule has been affirmed in Carney v. Carney, 16 Md. App. 253, 256, 295 A.2d
792, 795 (1972).
67. D.C. Code § 16-904 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 102 (1977).
68. Id.
69. It is uncertain under the new law whether the rule of Hooker v. Hooker, requiring
intent to permanently separate at the inception of the separation, will apply to the area of
limited divorce as well. It would seem unlikely under the court's reasoning in that case since
there would be no danger of "instant divorces," only "instant legal separations," which
would not destroy the bond of marriage and would still leave open the possibility of contem-
plation and reconciliation.
70. The 1977 amendments eliminated the other fault grounds for legal separation: deser-
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the immediate filing of a suit for legal separation in cases in which the
separation cannot be shown to be mutually voluntary, continuous, and
without cohabitation under the new no-fault ground. Under such a suit,
the plaintiff may seek additional benefits such as alimony, child support,
custody, injunctive relief, and property division.7'
Finally, section 16-905 has been amended to provide for the enlarge-
ment of decrees of legal separation into decrees for absolute divorce. This
may be accomplished
upon application of the party to whom the decree of legal separa-
tion was granted, a copy of which application shall be duly
served upon the adverse party, if the court finds on the basis of
affidavits that no reconciliation has taken place or is probable
and that a separation has continued voluntarily and without in-
terruption for a six-month period or without interruption for a
period of one year.72
This provision appears, perhaps inadvertently, to revert back to fault theo-
ries of divorce, insofar as it bars the nonmoving party from obtaining an
enlargement of a legal separation and mandates that the separation shall
have continued voluntarily. In thus limiting the right to move for an en-
largement to the moving party, and in requiring that the separation be
voluntary, the new code has become more restrictive than prior law. It is
expected that enlargement of legal separations may fall into disuse in view
of the availability of the six-month voluntary separation and the twelve-
month separation without cohabitation grounds for absolute divorce.
The annulment of marriages has not been significantly affected by the
new Act. As described by the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Duley v. Duley,73 there are two types of illegal marriages in
this jurisdiction: those which are void ab initio without the necessity of
obtaining a decree of annulment, and those which are void only when de-
clared so by a court decree.74
[T]he first class of marriages is void and the second merely voida-
ble. Thus we have two classes of illegal marriages, one declared
void from the beginning and without any standing in law, whose
tion and conviction of a felony. D.C. Code § 16-904 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107,
§ 102 (1977).
71. The right to divide property ancillary to a limited divorce was upheld in Tendrich v.
Tendrich, 90 U.S. App. D.C. 61, 193 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Reilly v. Reilly, 86 U.S. App.
D.C. 345, 182 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); and Posnick v. Posnick,
160 A.2d 804 (D.C. 1960).
72. D.C. Code § 16-905 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 103 (1977).
73. 151 A.2d 255 (D.C. 1959).
74. Id. at 257.
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nullity may be shown and must be recognized in any proceed-
ing. . . .Marriages of the second class. . . although forbidden
are not void until so declared by court decree. These marriages
therefore have a degree of validity and the courts are not com-
pelled under all circumstances to declare them void.75
Section 16-903 of the D.C. Code states that "a decree annulling the mar-
riage as illegal and void may be rendered on any of the grounds specified
by sections 30-101 and 30-103 as invalidating a marriage. ' 76 Section 30-
101 sets forth those marriages which are void ab initio, and includes inces-
tuous and bigamous marriages,77 while section 30-103 lists those marriages
which are voidable: (1) marriage of an "idiot" or one adjudged to be a
lunatic, (2) marriage in which either party's consent was secured by force
or fraud, (3) marriage in which either party is physically incapable of "en-
tering into the married state," and (4) marriage in which either party is
under the age of consent. The only change effected by the 1977 amend-
ments has been to add a paragraph to section 16-904 which enumerates
five grounds for annulment, including the bigamy ground from section 30-
101 and the four grounds listed in section 30-103.78 This is a change with-
out a difference.
IV. REAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
Procedures for the distribution of property have remained virtually un-
changed since they were first enacted in 1935.79 Prior to the 1977 amend-
ments, the D.C. Code provided as follows:
Upon the entry of a final decree of annulment or absolute di-
vorce, in the absence of a valid antenuptial or postnuptial agree-
ment in relation thereto, all property rights of the parties in joint
tenancy or tenancy by the entirety shall stand dissolved and, in
the same proceeding in which the decree is entered, the court
may award the property to the one lawfully entitled thereto or
apportion it in such manner as seems equitable, just and reason-
able.80
Consistent with the face of the statute, the courts have held that only
jointly held property may be apportioned.81 In Wheeler v. Wheeler,8 2 for
75. Id.
76. D.C. Code § 16-903 (1973).
77. D.C. Code § 30-101 (1973). D.C. Code § 30-102 provides that these marriages may be
"declared to have been null and void by judicial decree" as well.
78. D.C. Law 1-107; § 102 (1977).
79. Act of Aug. 7, 1935, ch. 453, § 3, 49 Stat. 540.
80. D.C. Code § 16-910 (1973).
81. Tendrich v. Tendrich, 90 U.S. App. D.C. 61, 193 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Wheeler
v. Wheeler, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 193, 188 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Reilly v. Reilly, 86 U.S.
[Vol. 27:469
The 1977 Marriage and Divorce Act
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit set aside a trial court's award to a wife of a percentage interest in
real property held solely in her husband's name. Acknowledging that the
terms of the statute83 clearly precluded it from making such an award, the
court addressed the issue of whether the "court has power from some other
source to award the wife an equity in property owned by the husband.
84
The court rejected the contention that such power to award property in
lieu of alimony could be found under its statutory or equitable powers.8 5
In order to justify such an award of an interest in separate property prior
to the 1977 amendments, it was necessary for a spouse to make a showing
of either a legal or equitable interest in the other spouse's solely titled
property or facts that would establish a basis for a constructive or resulting
trust.8 6
Courts have, however, been reluctant to find such equitable interests in
solely held property. In Mumma v. Mumma,8 7 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's award to the wife of a one-half
interest in land owned and paid for solely by the husband. The court re-
viewed the evidence relevant to the wife's contribution to the family fi-
nances and found that she had performed "sporadic clerical services" for
the husband. The court held that such services were insufficient to justify
award of a half interest in her. husband's property.88 This case should be
distinguished from situations in which the wife has made material finan-
cial contributions. In Lyons v. Lyons,89 the court ordered the husband to
pay his wife $7,500 in settlement of her equitable interest in a savings ac-
App. D.C. 345, 182 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); Mumma v.
Mumma, 280 A.2d 73 (D.C. 1971); Hunt v. Hunt, 208 A.2d 731 (D.C. 1965); Mazique v.
Mazique, 206 A.2d 577 (D.C. 1965), afdon other grounds, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 48, 356 F.2d
801 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 981 (1966).
82. 88 U.S. App. D.C. 193, 188 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
83. At the time of this decision, the applicable provision was D.C. Code § 16-409 (1940).
84. 88 U.S. App. D.C. at 194, 188 F.2d at 32.
85. Id. At the time this case was decided, the pertinent provision authorizing alimony
was D.C. Code § 16-411 (1940). The present alimony sections are D.C. Code §§ 16-911 to
16-914 (1973).
86. The courts have consistently held that this section applies only to property in which a
tenancy, joint or by the entirety, exists. It does not apply to individual property. See Wheeler
v. Wheeler, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 193, 188 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1951); McGean v. McGean, 339
A.2d 384 (D.C. 1975); Jett v. Jett, 221 A.2d 925 (D.C. 1966); Hunt v. Hunt, 208 A.2d 731
(D.C. 1965); Posnick v. Posnick, 160 A.2d 804 (D.C. 1960). Apart from the Code provision,
however, courts have equity power to reach property not covered in this section, including
individual property. See Mumma v. Mumma, 280 A.2d 73 (D.C. 1971); Hunt v. Hunt, 208
A.2d 731 (D.C. 1965).
87. 280 A.2d 73 (D.C. 1971).
88. Id. at 76.
89. 295 A.2d 903 (D.C. 1972).
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count which was held solely in his name. The trial court found that Mrs.
Lyons had made considerable monthly contributions from her earnings to
her husband's savings account over a period of several years. The appellate
court agreed, and held that there was sufficient justification in returning to
her that portion of the account which she had deposited. Similarly, in Hunt
v. Hunt,90 a husband and wife had purchased several properties as tenants
by the entirety but subsequently conveyed them to the husband's mother
after the husband was arrested on a felony charge. When the husband's
mother died, she left the properties to her son as sole beneficiary under her
will. The court awarded the wife a one-half interest in the properties
(which by then were in her husband's sole name) based on their finding
that the two parties had remained equitable owners of the properties since
they had been transferred to the husband's mother without considera-
tion.91 
District of Columbia courts have interpreted section 16-910 to give the
courts broad discretion in apportioning jointly held property.92
The trial court must "exercise a sound judicial discretion in
adjusting the property rights of the parties". . . . No hard and
fast rule can be laid down. Each case must be decided on its par-
ticular circumstances; and considering all those circumstances a
trial judge in his sound discretion must rule in a manner that
seems to him equitable, just and reasonable. 93
Courts rely upon several factors in determining distribution of the spouses'
jointly held property. In Chamberlain v. Chamberlain,94 the court found
that the wife had provided the total financial contribution for the parties'
jointly owned house and awarded it to her.95 The court also cited a
number of other considerations which affected its decision: the wife had
been awarded custody of all five children; her support payments were
modest in view of her expenses; the husband had a duty to provide for his
wife; and the parties had lived in the house for only a short while.96 Direct
financial contribution by the wife, although an important factor, is thus
not the sole and decisive factor in determining her interest in jointly held
90. 208 A.2d 731 (D.C. 1965).
91. 208 A.2d at 733. The record disclosed that the transfers were made to put the proper-
ties beyond the reach of creditors and to enable the husband to proceed informapauperir
with respect to his criminal trial. Id.
92. It should be noted that prior to the 1935 amendments, a separate action was required
in order to partition jointly held property since joinder rules were not then in effect. See Act
of Aug. 7, 1935, ch. 453, § 3, 49 Stat. 540.
93. Lundregan v. Lundregan, 176 A.2d 790, 792 (D.C. 1962).
94. 287 A.2d 530 (D.C.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972).
95. Id. at 532.
96. Id.
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property.97 In fact, the trial court may award a wife an amount in excess of
that which she has contributed.98
In this jurisdiction, when "real property is purchased entirely by one
spouse, and title is taken in the name of both as tenants by the entirety...
the consideration to be implied for the share of the non-purchasing spouse
is the faithful performance of . . . [the] marriage vows." 99 This rule, of
course, brings marital fault into the determination. For example, in Sebold
v. Sebold,'°° the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the faith-
ful performance of the marital vows was a sufficient ground for awarding
the wife a one-half interest in the parties' jointly owned property, even
though she had made no financial contribution. 101 Conversely, in Mazique
v. Mazique,'0 2 the court denied the wife any share in the couple's jointly-
owned residence after it was found that she had deserted her husband
"with malice prepense."' 10 3 Thus, while the court's discretion to distribute
jointly owned property is flexible, guidelines have emerged on a case-by-
case basis.
The 1977 amendments have significantly augmented the divorce court's
jurisdiction over real property by providing it with authority to distribute
both jointly and separately titled real property. This power is indeed a
salutory and much needed change, and will permit the court to better pro-
tect a dependent spouse. The only property remaining beyond the court's
jurisdiction is: (1) property disposed of pursuant to a valid antenuptial or
postnuptial agreement or a decree of legal separation, (2) sole and separate
property acquired prior to the marriage, (3) sole and separate property ac-
quired during the marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, and (4) any
increase thereof or property acquired in exchange therefor.1
°4
The first exception to the court's jurisdiction, property distributed under
an agreement by the parties, merely echoes prior versions of the property
distribution statute. Such property has never been subject to distribution
97. See Lundregan v. Lundregan, 176 A.2d 790,792 (D.C. 1962).
98. See Slaughter v. Plaughter, 83 U.S. App. D.C. 301, 302, 171 F.2d 129, 130 (D.C. Cir.
1948).
99. King v. King, 286 A.2d 234, 237 (D.C. 1972). See also Sebold v. Sebold, 143 U.S.
App. D.C. 406, 414, 444 F.2d 864, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Mazique v. Mazique, 206 A.2d 577
(D.C. 1965), afid on other grounds, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 48, 356 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 981 (1966); Johnson v. Johnson, 257 A.2d 482, 483 (D.C. 1969); Lundregan
v. Lundregan, 176 A.2d 790, 792 (D.C. 1962).
100. 143 U.S. App. D.C. 406, 444 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
101. 143 U.S. App. D.C. at 414, 444 F.2d at 872.
102. 206 A.2d 577 (D.C. 1965), aff'don other grounds, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 48, 356 F.2d
801 (D.C. Cir.), cert. deniea 384 U.S. 981 (1966).
103. 123 U.S. App. D.C. at 52, 356 F.2d at 805.
104. D.C. Code § 16-910 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 107 (1977).
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by the court. The remaining three exceptions are aimed at those types of
property which were initially titled in a spouse's sole name and were ac-
quired from a source from which the other spouse is unlikely to have had
any connection or opportunity to have made any contribution.
Subsection (b) of amended section 16-910 provides for the distribution
of all other real property, regardless of title, and expressly states that the
distribution shall be made "in a manner that is equitable, just and reason-
able, after considering all relevant factors." It also sets forth the following
nonexclusive factors to be considered:
the duration of the marriage, any prior marriage of either party,
the age, health, occupation, amount and sources of income, voca-
tional skills, employability, assets, debts, and needs of each of the
parties, provisions for the custody of minor children, whether the
distribution is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the
opportunity of each for future acquisition of assets and income.
The court shall also consider each party's contribution to the ac-
quisition, preservation, appreciation, dissipation or depreciation
in value of the assets subject to distribution under this subsection,
and each party's contribution as a homemaker or to the family
unit. 105
These factors have been borrowed largely from the case law prece-
dents. 106 Interestingly enough, a number of these factors may be found in
Circuit Judge Bazelon's opinion in Quarles v. Quarles,10 7 a case dealing
with the propriety of an alimony award. Speaking of the court's discretion
to award alimony, Bazelon states that:
[N]o fixed set of rules or formulae can be substituted for a careful
study of the particular facts and circumstances in each case. Nev-
ertheless, certain impelling factors of an equitable nature have
always affected such awards. Among the factors have been: the
duration of the marriage; the number and age of the children; the
age and health of the parties; their respective economic condi-
tions-both present and prospective; the wife's contribution to
the accumulation of the husband's property; the circumstances
under which the divorce was granted; the effect, if any, upon the
family; and the interest of society generally to prevent a person,
wherever possible, from becoming a public charge. 08
Thus, the question raised by these nonexclusive statutory factors is
whether they provide any criteria which have not already been considered
105. Id. at § 107(b).
106. See text accompanying notes 93-102 supra.
107. 86 U.S. App. D.C. 41, 179 F.2d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
108. 86 U.S. App. D.C. at 42, 179 F.2d at 58.
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by the courts of this jurisdiction in dividing jointly-held property. The ap-
parent answer is that the new law has simply codified prior case law in this
area.
V. CUSTODY
The custody statute has remained largely unchanged from the date it
was first enacted until 1977. The 1860 version provided that the court had
jurisdiction to order and direct which parent was to be awarded custody of
the children in any divorce. It further provided that the court could direct
who would be charged with the children's maintenance. 10 9 A 1901 amend-
ment modified the statute to give the court additional power to decide
which spouse would be awarded custody of infants pending the divorce
proceeding."10 Except for changes in phraseology, however, there have
been no significant alterations in custody law.I'
Since 1897, the case law of this jurisdiction consistently held that the
best interest of the child is paramount in determining custody:
In all such cases . . . the courts, looking principally to the wel-
fare and happiness of the children, will award their care and cus-
tody to the one party or the other as will best promote their
interest and general welfare. And acting on that principle, no cer-
tain fixed rule for the government of the courts in all cases can be
laid down, other than this, that the best interest of the children
must be consulted as paramount. It has been repeatedly declared
in such cases, that the courts do not act to enforce the rights of
either parent, but to protect the interest and general welfare of
the children. " 2
This principle has been reiterated consistently for 80 years. One of the
leading cases in this jurisdiction in dealing with judicial discretion in cus-
tody matters observed:
Out of a maze of conflicting testimony, usually including what
one court called 'a tolerable amount of perjury,' the judge must
make a decision which will inevitably affect materially the future
life of an innocent child. In making his decision, the judge can
109. Act of June 19, 1860, ch.158, § 1, 12 Stat. 60; R.S.D.C. § 747.
110. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 975, 31 Stat. 1346. The following year, this section
was amended to state that the court may determine "who" is awarded custody. Act of June
30, 1902, ch. 1329, 32 Stat. 537. This was done to allow the court to grant custody to someone
other than the child's parents. In Hitchcock v. Thomason, 148 A.2d 458 (D.C.), rev'd on
other grounds, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 27, 274 F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir. 1959), for example, the court
awarded custody to the child's grandmother.
111. The Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 91-1, 77 Stat. 561, made only minor
changes in phraseology.
112. Wells v. Wells, 11 App. D.C. 392, 395 (1897) (emphasis in original).
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obtain little help from precedents or general principles. Each case
stands alone. After attempting to appraise and compare the per-
sonalities and capabilities of the two parents, the judge must en-
deavor to look into the future and decide that the child's best
interests will be served if committed to the custody of the father
or mother. He starts with the premise, as did the trial judge here,
that the best interests of the child would be served by living in a
united home with the affection, companionship and care of both
father and mother, but that possibility has been eliminated before
the case reaches the judge. So, the question for him is what is best
for the child within the limitations presented. When the judge
makes his decision, he has no assurance that his decision is the
right one. He can only hope that he is right. He realizes that an-
other equally able and conscientious judge might have arrived at
a different decision on the same evidence."13
Spokesmen for the bar groups generally opposed statutory enunciation
of any criteria and expressed their satisfaction with existing case law dur-
ing the drafting stages. They stated that they preferred to rely upon case by
case development of custody law. The bar's alternative proposal, therefore,
had set forth no new criteria to guide the courts in custody cases. In its
1977 amendments, the District of Columbia Council nevertheless estab-
lished five nonexclusive "relevant factors" which the Court "should con-
sider" in making custody determinations:
(1) the wishes of the child as to his or her custodian, where
practicable,
(2) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to the child's
custody,
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or
her parent or parents, his or her siblings, and any other per-
son who may emotionally or psychologically affect the
child's best interest,
(4) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school, and com-
munity,
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals in-
volved. 114
These factors were derived from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, 115 and this section is a holdover from the original version of Bill 1-89,
113. Coles v. Coles, 204 A.2d 330, 332 (D.C. 1964). Accord UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ACT § 402 (1973 version).
114. D.C. Code § 16-911 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 108(d) (1977).
115. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402 (1973 version).
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which was intended to adopt the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. 16
Yet the enactment of this new statutory language is of questionable value
since a careful review of the five factors shows that nothing has been ad-
ded to appellate decisions in this district.
Generally, judges in this jurisdiction do not make custody awards with-
out first seeing and talking with any child old enough to express a view, in
order to determine the first of the five factors, "the wishes of the child as to
his or her custodian." There is ample authority in existing precedents for
such action. In Lindau v. Lindau, 17 a husband appealed a decision award-
ing custody to the wife. The husband alleged that the judge had applied a
presumption in favor of the maternal custody of young children, thus im-
posing a burden upon him to prove his wife's unfitness as a mother.' 18 The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that a fair read-
ing of the record indicated that the trial judge had been primarily con-
cerned with the child's best interest. As evidence of this, the court noted
that the judge had interviewed the child in chambers to make a more in-
formed judgment as to the custody award." 19 However, since the control-
ling interest is the child's welfare, not the child's desires, the judge does not
abandon his function as parens patriae if the child's expressed wishes ap-
pear to be inconsistent with the child's best interest. Indeed, an intuitive
judge may decide that a child's expressed wishes do not reflect the child's
true desire.
As for the second enunciated criteria, the wishes of the parents, it is
equally clear that every disputed custody case involves a consideration of
the contending parents' wishes. But, as stated in Boone v. Boone,' 20 the
general proposition will continue to prevail that "the rights of the parent to
the child are secondary to the welfare of the child . . . . [W]hat is best for
the child, rather than the natural right of the parent, is the controlling fac-
tor." 21 The court shall consider all five factors and any other considera-
tions that the court deems relevant to the child's best interest. In this
regard, the law remains unchanged.
A number of cases in this jurisdiction have already looked to the third
"new" factor, the child's interaction and interrelationship with his or her
parents or siblings as a consideration in awarding custody. In Bradley v.
116. See text accompanying notes 5-10 supra.
117. 286 A.2d 864 (D.C. 1972).
118. Id. at 865.
119. Id.
120. 80 U.S. App. D.C. 152, 150 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
121. 80 U.S. App. D.C. at 155, 150 F.2d at 156, (quoting Holtsclaw v. Mercer, 79 U.S.
App. D.C. 252, 145 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1944)).
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Bradley,122 for example, the court affirmed a custody award by the lower
court because the trial court "had ample opportunity to form an enligh-
tened opinion as to the personalities, past conduct and behavioral patterns
of the two parents."' 23 Similar considerations were examined in the re-
cently decided case of Benvenuto v. Benvenuto:' 24
Mrs. Benvenuto has been the primary caretaker and the main-
stay of this child's world. It is [a psychiatrist's] recommendation
that [the child] spend the bulk of her time with the parent who
shows much less 'pathology' since the amount of [the father's]
unresolved conflicts leave 'little left to be a parental figure.' In his
professional opinion [the mother] should receive custody because
of the normal relationship between her and the child and her
supportive family. 125
Thus, it is evident that judges in this jurisdiction are already familiar with
this particular factor.
The fourth factor cited by the 1977 amendment, the child's adjustment
to his or her home, school, and community, was also considered in Boone
v. Boone.126 In Boone, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reviewed a custody award to the husband by the dis-
trict court. The lower court had taken into consideration the fact that the
children were accustomed to their present home, their associations and en-
vironments were "of the best," they were attending excellent schools, they
had access to a nearby hospital and were generally happy in their home,
neighborhood, and school.' 27 The appellate court agreed with the trial
court's assessment of the evidence, even though it reversed the award on
other grounds. 128
Finally, a number of prior cases have given weight to the last factor, the
mental and physical health of all individuals involved. Both parties in
Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski129 secured the services of expert witnesses who
gave psychiatric and psychological testimony as to their son's emotional
welfare. The court considered this factor along with the other evidence
presented. 130 The mental and physical health of the child was also an im-
122. 172 A.2d 414 (D.C. 1961).
123. Id.
124. 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 1033 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 14, 1977).
125. Id. at 1038.
126. 80 U.S. App. D.C. 152, 150 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
127. 80 U.S. App. D.C. at 153, 150 F.2d at 154.
128. The court of appeals decided that in addition to the evidence produced by the par-
ents, the trial court should have considered reports from disinterested parties as well. 80 U.S.
App. D.C. at 156, 150 F.2d at 157.
129. 296 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1972).
130. Id. at 439.
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portant determinant in the Benvenuto decision.
A custody determination is more than an evaluation of love
and affection. It is a composite, inter alia, of a totality of informa-
tion concerning also the personal safety of a child, the morals and
health of the child, the happiness of the youngster, where her bas-
tions of security exist, where she derives most of her essential
comfort and needs, where she has the greatest stability, what
home environments are offered, what are the parenting capabili-
ties or willingness to provide quality care, what has prologue
shown us. Essentially, this decision-making must be an unbiased
consideration of the best interests of the child based on her indi-
vidual characteristics and the relationships of the parents and the
child. 131
It is therefore apparent from the leading cases in this jurisdiction that all
of the District of Columbia Council's five "new" factors have long been
among the many relevant criteria that have gone into custody determina-
tions here. Nothing novel has been added by this statutory enactment and
no change in custody proceedings in this jurisdiction can be anticipated as
a result of this amendment.
Under the new law it remains unclear whether fault will be considered
in determination of custody awards even though divorces are now
awarded strictly on no-fault grounds. In an attempt to anticipate how the
courts will deal with this issue, Professor Harvey L. Zuckman has noted
that although custody criteria under the 1977 law were derived from the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, the D.C. Council omitted the fol-
lowing language found in the Uniform Law:132 "The court shall not con-
sider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship
to the child." 33 Professor Zuckman speculates that the absence of this pro-
vision implies that Superior Court judges may continue to consider "fault"
in custody adjudications. He is correct insofar as the "fault" is deemed
relevant to the best interest of the child. Nevertheless, it must be observed
that in a number of cases over the years custody has been awarded to the
parent found guilty of marital "fault." One such case was Jaffe v. Jaffe,134
in which the husband was awarded a divorce on the grounds of his wife's
adultery. The wife was given custody of the children and the husband ap-
pealed the award. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
131. 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 1033, 1039 (D.C. Super Ct. Apr. 26, 1977).
132. See H. Zuckman, Guide to the New D.C. Marriage and Divorce Law, 1 DISTRICT
LAW. 44 (1977).
133. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402 (1973 version).
134. 74 U.S. App. D.C. 394, 124 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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Columbia found ample precedent for such an adjudication 135 and dis-
cerned no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court since "[i]t was
clear that the wife was a devoted and successful mother."1 36 The court
stated that courts had the discretion to award custody to unsuccessful de-
fendants in divorce suits. 137 More recently, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, in Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski,138 affirmed a custody award to
an adulterous husband and placed the significance of marital fault in per-
spective:
[T]he presumption of unfitness of an adulterous parent should
not be viewed as an absolute bar to an award of custody to that
parent. . . .All of the facts of each individual case must be con-
sidered by the trial judge as they may be relevant to the best in-
terest and welfare of the child and not the adversary rights of the
parents. 139
Thus, while fault grounds have been eliminated for absolute divorce in this
jurisdiction, fault is still relevant in custody proceedings, although its role
is somewhat diminshed. Again, little, if anything, has been added in this
legislation to the custody standards already applied by the courts.
VI. JURISDICTION AND SERVICE OF PROCESS
Since a divorce action is a proceeding in rem, the res being the legal
status of the parties, jurisdiction may be secured over a nonresident de-
fendant either by constructive service, such as publication, or by actual
service of process outside the District of Columbia. 14° Custody proceed-
ings are also in rem actions' 4' and constructive service is therefore simi-
larly sufficient to bring the res before the court. 142 In Mankiewicz v.
Mankiewicz,143 a wife sued her absent husband for divorce on the ground
of desertion. She also sought legal custody of their child, who resided with
her. Process was effected by publication. The husband failed to appear and
was represented by court-appointed counsel at trial. The trial court
awarded her an absolute divorce, but rejected her request for custody due
to lack of jurisdiction, since her husband had not been personally
135. 74 U.S. App. D.C. at 395, n.1, 124 F.2d at 234, n.l.
136. 74 U.S. App. D.C. at 395, 124 F.2d at 234.
137. Id.
138. 296 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1972).
139. Id. at 439 (citation omitted).
140. See, e.g., Thompson v. Tanner, 53 U.S. App. D.C. 3, 6, 287 F. 980, 983 (D.C. Cir.
1923).
141. See Mankiewicz v. Mankiewicz, 177 A.2d 913, 915 (D.C. 1962).
142. Id. at 915. The relation between parent and child, like that between married per-
sons, is a legal status which is sufficient to give in remjurisdiction. Id.
143. 177 A.2d 913 (D.C. 1962).
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served. 144 On appeal, the court reversed this judgment, adopting the in rem
rule of other jurisdictions.1 45 The court offered a practical consideration
for its holding: a rule requiring personal service on an out-of-state spouse
would enable the absent party to "forever defeat the innocent parent's
claim to custody, merely by staying out of the District of Columbia.' 46
The in rem theory facilitated the resolution of parental rights and avoided
the "anomalous and anguishing" situation of a parent enjoying physical
but not legal custody.
By contrast, a judgment for support or alimony, or one which purports
to affect title to property rights outside the District of Columbia must be
based upon in personam jurisdiction.147 In Gaines v. Gaines,'48 a plaintiff
residing in the District of Columbia sued her husband for limited divorce
and sought alimony. The defendant was personally served in Virginia, his
state of residence. The district court issued a decree of legal separation and
awarded the wife alimony. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed the alimony award, ruling that such
an order was a judgment inpersonam which could only be entered against
a defendant who had either been personally served within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court or had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court.' 49 The only res before the court was the husband's marital status,
over which the lower court had already exercised the full extent of its juris-
diction in issuing the decree of limited divorce. I50 The wife's contention
that the court had jurisdiction over the alimony award because it was
merely an incident of her action for legal separation was rejected. The
court reiterated that "[w]hile an action for divorce is in rem, an effort to
obtain a money judgment, unconnected with the claim of, right to, or lien
upon, real or personal property, is in personam."'5'1
The statute allowing constructive service remained largely unchanged
from 1901 until the 1977 amendments. 52 The principal provision of the
1901 law required publication weekly for three successive weeks and made
it necessary for the plaintiff to file an affidavit showing either that notice
144. Id. at 914.
145. Id. at 915.
146. Id. at 915-16.
147. Cf Bunnell v. Bunnell, 25 F. 214, 216 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1885) (constructive service
by seizure of property within state gives court jurisdiction).
148. 81 U.S. App. D.C. 260, 157 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
149. 81 U.S. App. D.C. at 262, 157 F.2d at 522-23. The husband appeared and contested
the court's personal jurisdiction over him. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, §§ 108, 109, 31 Stat. 1206, 1207; D.C. Code, § 13-340
(1973).
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had been mailed to defendant's last address or that after a diligent search,
the defendant's last address could not be determined. Upon failure of the
defendant to appear, the case could nevertheless proceed to judgment.
Certain precautions, however, were included in the statute. A guardian ad
litem for minors had to be appointed, and a later amendment stated that
counsel had to be appointed for minors. 5 3 The 1901 Code further required
the court to appoint an attorney to represent all absent defendants and all
unrepresented defendants in uncontested divorce cases.' 54
These requirements were based, of course, on the public policy of ensur-
ing due process and basic fairness. In the recent case of Bearstop v.
Bearstop,55 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted a five-part
standard to be applied in determining whether to allow constructive serv-
ice. The court held that the following information must be submitted by
the plaintiff in affidavit form: (1) time and place where the parties last
resided as spouses, (2) the last time the parties were in contact with each
other, (3) the name and address of the defendant's last employer known to
the plaintiff, (4) the names and addresses of close relatives, and (5) any
other information that could "furnish a fruitful basis for further inquiry by
one truly bent on learning the present whereabouts of the defendant."' 56
Rule 4 of the Civil Rules of the Superior Court of the District of Colum-
bia, stating the requirements for service of process, has been modified by
Domestic Relations Rule 4 in order to accommodate domestic relations
practice. 157 Specifically, Domestic Relations Rule 40) provides:
Notices relating to proceedings in this Division of which pub-
lication is required shall be published in the Washington Law
Reporter for the prescribed time in addition to any other news-
paper or periodical specifically designated by the Court. If it is
shown to the satisfaction of the Court that an undue hardship
would be incurred by the requirements of this section it may or-
der notices to be published in any other manner deemed appro-
priate within D.C. Code, 1967 Edition, § 13-340.158
153. Act of June 30, 1902, ch. 1329, 32 Stat. 523.
154. Originally D.C. Code § 982 (1902), this provision is presently found in D.C. Code
§ 16-918 (1973), which also includes authorization for the payment of attorney fees by
whichever party the court directs.
155. 377 A.2d 405 (D.C. 1977).
156. Id. at 408. In enunciating these standards, the court was guided by the consitutional
principle set forth in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (a
default judgment against an absent defendant is void unless methods "reasonably calculated
to provide actual notice" were used). 377 A.2d at 408.
157. See Advisory Committee Comment, reprinted in, D.C. CODE ENCYCL., Annot.,
SUPER. CT. R.-DoM. Rel. 4 (West Supp. 1977).
158. D.C. SUPER. CT.-DoM. REL. R. 4(j).
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This "hardship" provision has been applied in several cases, including
Johnson v. Johnson,159 in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
reversed the superior court's denial of a plaintiff's motion to allow publica-
tion in only the least expensive newspaper. The plaintiff was proceeding in
forma pauperis and had made a bona fide effort to comply with the re-
quirements of publication. Citing the explanatory note to Rule 4(j), the
court pointed out that a measure of discretion is available in ordering pub-
lication for cases informapauperis.160 The court concluded by stating that
denial of the plaintiffs motion had deprived her of access to the court
solely because of financial considerations, thus denying her her due pro-
cess rights under Boddie v. Connecticut'6' and similar precedents. 162
Through the 1977 amendments, the District of Columbia Council has
further eroded the requirements of Rule 4(j) by allowing posting as a sub-
stitute for publication in certain instances:
In actions for divorce in which service by publication is au-
thorized under this chapter, and satisfactory evidence is pre-
sented to the court that the plaintiff is unable to pay the cost of
publishing an advertisement pursuant to D.C. Code sec. 13-340,
without substantial hardship to himself or herself, or to his or her
family, the court may direct that such publication may be made
by posting the order of publication defined in D.C. Code sec. 13-
339, for a period of twenty one calendar days, in the Clerk's Of-
fice of the Family division of the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia. 63
The otherwise commendable objective of alleviating expenses faced by in-
digent plaintiffs who seek access to the divorce courts would seem to deny
due process to indigent defendants. There is now a serious question as to
whether such defendants receive sufficient due process protections if their
only notice consists of a posting in the Family Division Clerk's office.
Practitioners, including those representing indigents, should note, how-
ever, that this 1977 amendment to the publication provisions does not
eliminate the "diligent effort" obligation to find the defendant, since sec-
tion 13-340 of the D.C. Code remains intact except for the addition of the
159. 329 A.2d 451 (D.C. 1974).
160. Id. at 452.
161. 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (given position of marriage relationship in our society, and state
monopolization of means for dissolving relationship, due process bars states from denying
parties access to courts because of inability to pay court costs).
162. For similar cases in the District of Columbia, see Harris v. Harris, 137 U.S. App.
D.C. 318, 424 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Gomez v. Gomez, 341
A.2d 423 (D.C. 1975).
163. D.C. Code § 13-340(a)-(1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 201(a) (1977).
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authority to post instead of publish when proceeding informapauperis.'64
VII. APPOINTMENT OF ATTORNEYS & TERMINATION OF APPEARANCE
Since 1901, the District of Columbia divorce law has provided that in all
uncontested divorce cases and in any other divorce case in which the court
deemed it necessary or proper, a disinterested attorney "shall" be assigned
by the court to enter an appearance for the defendant and to actively de-
fend the cause. This attorney was to be compensated as the court deemed
proper and by whichever of the parties the court designated. 65 In 1949, an
amendment was passed extending the application of this section to annul-
ment proceedings as well.166 Finally, in 1970, another amendment was ad-
ded stating that in any proceeding in which a child's custody was in
question, the court could appoint a disinterested attorney to appear on the
child's behalf and to represent the child's best interests. 67
According to the courts, this statute was intended to prevent the grant-
ing of divorce decrees without proof,' 68 to require caution before granting
uncontested divorces,' 69 and to prevent collusion in divorce cases. 170 As
recently as 1974, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reaffirmed
these principles in Campbell v. Campbell'7' when it reversed a lower
court's divorce judgment which had been granted without the participation
of either defendant or appointed counsel at trial. In assessing whether the
court-appointed defense attorney was necessary at a divorce hearing, the
court concluded that because the state was a third party to every divorce
action, an attorney was necessary to assert the District's interest actively in
such suits.' 72 Asserting the District's interest in sponsoring "the welfare of
society and the sanctity of the marriage relation,"' 173 the court stated:
164. D.C. Code § 13-340(b) (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 201(b) (1977).
165. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 982, 31 Stat. 1347.
166. Act of June 20, 1949, ch. 229, 63 Stat. 213. A change in phraseology was made by
Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 16-918, 77 Stat. 562. See also D.C. Code § 16-418
(1961).
167. Act of June 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 145(e)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 557. See D.C.
Code § 16-918 (1973).
168. See Stone v. Stone, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 5, 136 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1943). See also Act
of June 19, 1860, ch. 158, § 1; 12 Stat. 59; R.S.D.C. § 737, which required that no judgment
for divorce be rendered on default without proof.
169. Id
170. See Rea v. Rea, 124 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1954). In Rea, the court stated that it is
the policy in the District of Columbia that no divorce should be granted except on the basis
of a hearing in open court at which evidence is adduced. Id. at 922.
171. 325 A.2d 188 (D.C. 1974).
172. Id. at 189.
173. Id., (quoting Simmons v. Simmons, 57 U.S. App. D.C. 216, 217, 19 F.2d 690, 691
(D.C. Cir. 1927)).
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In a divorce suit the state becomes in a sense a party, not neces-
sarily to oppose, but to make sure that a divorce will not prevail
without sufficient and lawful cause shown by the real facts. Both
the policy and the letter of the law concur in guarding against
collusion and fraud.74
Basing its decision on this premise, the court held that the court-appointed
attorney's presence at a fact-finding was necessary even though he had
been unable to contact the defendant. Had the attorney been present, he
might have found it advisable to test the validity and legal sufficiency of
the plaintiffs case by cross-examination of that party and her witnesses. '75
Accordingly, a court-appointed counsel would have ensured compliance
with the statutory prohibition against divorces on default without proof. 176
Under the 1977 amendments, the appointment of counsel has become
discretionary rather than mandatory: "In all cases under this chapter,
where the court deems it necessary or proper, a disinterested attorney may
be appointed by the court to enter his appearance for the defendant and
actively defend the cause."' 177 It is noteworthy that the original version of
Bill 1-89 had completely eliminated the appointment of counsel except on
behalf of children. This was in accord with the sentiments of a number of
community members who attended the hearings and expressed the view
that the mandatory appointment of counsel created an unnecessary and
expensive hurdle to obtaining an uncontested divorce. '7 8 Most representa-
tives of the bar committees also favored the elimination of the mandatory
appointment in uncontested cases. The report from David A. Clarke,
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law, stated
that "this change is consistent with the proper absence in the current law of
any requirement that persons must hire an attorney to obtain a divorce
decree or to initiate actions to enforce support payments in the Family
Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia."' 179 Subse-
174. Id. (emphasis in original), (quoting Gage v. Gage, 89 F. Supp. 987, 991 (D.D.C.
1950)).
175. 325 A.2d at 190. The court acknowledged that court-appointed defense counsel may
decide not to contest the divorce action, since often the circumstances may afford no basis
for any defense. Id.
176. This policy has less application in contested divorce cases. For example, in Mazique
v. Mazique, 206 A.2d 577 (D.C. 1965), affd on other ground; 123 U.S. App. D.C. 48, 356
F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 369 U.S. 981(1966), it was held that a party to a contested
divorce has the right to proceed pro se. The theory underlying such a holding is that there is
less likelihood of fraud or collusion in contested cases.
177. D.C. Code § 16-918 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § I10(a) (1977).
178. The expense involved in such cases is vividly demonstrated to less affluent plaintiffs
when they learn of the court's practice of requiring a $100.00 deposit with the clerk as a
minimum fee for appointed counsel, prior to granting a motion for such appointment.
179. Report from David Clarke, supra note 11.
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quent to the enactment of the 1977 amendments, the Family Division of
the Superior Court issued implementation guidelines which provide in
part:
Plaintiffs or their attorneys may still seek to have counsel ap-
pointed to defend in cases wherein service of process has been
had, but no answer filed within the time provided ....
Cases in which the plaintiffs or their attorneys do not make
application for appointment of counsel will be reviewed by the
court for a determination of the necessity for such appoint-
ments.180
The effect of this guideline is to require court review of the need for coun-
sel in all uncontested divorce cases in which the plaintiff does not request
the appointment of counsel to represent the defendant. Thus, it is still nec-
essary for the judge to review whether counsel for defendant should be
appointed. Some practitioners view this procedure as inconsistent with the
legislative intent of the Council in replacing "shall" with "may." Never-
theless, many practitioners routinely move to have counsel for defendant
appointed to safeguard the rights of both parties. This tactic also assures
the validity of any subsequent actions taken by the court by short-circuit-
ing claims that there was a denial of due process or that no diligent effort
was made to provide actual notice. 8"
The 1977 legislation has also made changes affecting the termination of
an attorney's appearance. There are several proceedings in which the
court, either expressly 82 or by implication, 183 retains jurisdiction of the
matter after a decree or order is entered. For example, after a decree of
alimony is entered, the court retains jurisdiction for future orders concern-
ing modification of the amount awarded, enforcement for nonpayment,
termination of the award, and so on.' 84 Similar considerations apply to
custody awards, child support, and maintenance awards. Thus, an attor-
ney's appearance in the aforementioned proceedings may not terminate
with the entry of the immediate decree or court order. Under prior prac-
tice, an attorney would have to take the initiative to withdraw from such
180. 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 593 (April 7, 1977). The guidelines were intended to aid
the court, the public, and the bar until formal adoption of rules dealing with matters covered
in the new legislation.
181. Counsel for plaintiff would also be well advised to avoid risking a violation of the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility by preparing pleadings for unrepresented defend-
ants in uncontested cases.
182. See D.C. Code § 16-914 (1973) (retention of jurisdiction as to alimony and custody
of children).
183. See D.C. Code § 16-912 (1973) (decrees of permanent alimony and their enforce-
ment); D.C. Code § 16-916 (1973) (maintenance decrees and their enforcement).
184. See D.C. Code § 16-914 (1973).
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cases in order to terminate his or her appearance. The new legislation has
changed this. It provides that:
[T]he appearance of an attorney ...shall be deemed to have
terminated for the purpose of service of any motion, process, or
any other pleading, upon completion of the case ending in a
judgment, adjudication, decree, or final order from which no ap-
peal has been taken . . . .There shall be no action required of
any person or attorney under this subsection, but the court hav-
ing jurisdiction over the matter may suspend the termination of
the appearance on its own motion, or on the motion of any party
to the case prior to the expiration of the time for appeal.185
This modification appears designed to promote certainty for all parties as
to when an attorney's appearance terminates. It is also a convenience for
lawyers who no longer have to withdraw from a case in order to terminate
their appearance. Finally, it affords certain procedural safeguards by pro-
viding that a termination of appearance prior to expiration of the appeal
period may be suspended by the court upon motion.
VIII. ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
D.C. Code section 16-911 specifies the procedural mechanisms available
for the enforcement of alimony pendenle lite, permanent alimony, child
support, and maintenance orders.' 86 The nature of such orders has been
described as follows: "[T]he husband becomes liable for the payment of
installments of alimony as they accrue. The wife has a vested right to col-
lect them. The obligation is enforceable by execution, by sequestration, or
by contempt proceedings. Failure to make the payments constitutes a seri-
ous default."'' 8 7
Johnson v. Johnson 8 8 presents a case in which a wife appealed from the
trial court's denial of her motion to hold her husband in contempt of a
court order for child support. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
set out the options available in such cases:
185. D.C. Code § 16-918 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 1I0(a) (1977). This
section of the 1977 amendments was derived from MD. CODE ANNr. art. 10, § 45 (1975)
(termination after appeal time has expired).
186. D.C. Code § 16-911 (1973) provides for alimony pendente lite and money for the
maintenance of legal actions, and sets forth the enforcement alternatives. Both § 16-912
(permanent alimony) and § 16-916 (maintenance of wife and minor children) refer back to
§ 16-911 for the manner of enforcement.
187. Cole v. Cole, 67 F. Supp. 134, 136-37 (D.D.C. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 161
F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See also Kephart v. Kephart, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 373, 377, 193
F.2d 677, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952) (the award of alimony is a
money judgment on which a writ of execution may issue).
188. 195 A.2d 406 (D.C. 1963).
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There are two avenues by which a wife may seek enforcement
of an order for support issued in this jurisdiction. As each instal-
ment matures, it becomes a judgment debt and (1) she may exe-
cute thereon as upon any other judgment for money; or (2), as in
the present case, . . . [the court may] enforce a support order
against a husband by "imprisonment for disobedience.". . . The
burden is upon the husband, however, to show by competent evi-
dence a reasonable excuse for his nonperformance and where he
offers no valid reason for his default, the wife is entitled to the
aid of the court in the enforcement of its order by imprisonment,
unless the husband should purge himself of the arrears. 189
The court stated that proper accounting procedure required that all pay-
ments be credited against the earliest arrears so that "accrued arrearages
would equal total instalments due less payments made,' ' 9° and held that
the trial court had erred in denying the wife's motion since the husband
had neither offered to pay arrearages nor shown any justification for non-
payment.
The 1977 Act has facilitated the enforcement and collection of support
payments for a spouse or for children by expanding the number of en-
forcement procedures available under section 16-911. The prior version of
the Act provided for attachment, imprisonment, sequestration,' 91 and in-
junctions against disposition of property. 92 The new Act has added the
word "garnishment" to section 16-911. 193 It also states that "[i]f a party
under court order to make payments under this section is in arrears, [the
court may] order the party to make an assignment of part of his or her
salary, wages, earnings or other income to the person entitled to receive the
payments .... ,"194 Furthermore, the attachment, garnishment, or assign-
ment is binding on the employer and forbids discrimination against the
employee by the employer because of the binding order. 195 This amend-
189. Id. at 407 (footnote omitted).
190. Id. at 408.
191. A writ of sequestration may be issued against a party who fails or refuses to pay
alimony, suit money, or child support. The sequestered property may be real or personal and
it may be held until there is compliance with the court's order. See D.C. Code §§ 16-911, 916
(1973).
192. In the words of the 1973 statute, "the court may enjoin any disposition of the hus-
band's property to avoid the collection of the allowances so required." D.C. Code
§ 16-911(2) (1973).
193. D.C. Code § 16-911 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 108(b) (1977). It
should be noted that garnishment was available and was utilized as a remedy by virtue of
other provisions of the Code prior to the 1977 amendments. This is another instance of a
change without a difference.
194. D.C. Code § 16-911 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 108(c) (1977).
195. Id at § 108(e).
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ment clears the way for more effective enforcement of support obligations
and protects defendants who are subject to such orders. The ban on the
discharge of employees has the practical purpose of keeping defendants
employed so that they will maintain their financial ability to make the
payments. The availability of garnishment as an enforcement measure is
especially significant in light of recent legislation allowing for the garnish-
ment of the wages of federal employees 196 and employees of the District of
Columbia. 197
Finally, the Marriage and Divorce Act gives the court power to order
that "maintenance or support payments be made to the clerk of the court
for remittance to the person entitled to receive the payments."1 98 As a mat-
ter of practice, the Superior Court has exercised its discretion for many
years by requiring that payments for spousal and child support be made
through the court under Rule 403 of the Domestic Relations Rules.199 As
noted in the Advisory Committee Notes to this rule, payment through the
clerk supplies the court with its own record of payments made pursuant to
its order, thus expediting any necessary enforcement proceedings.
IX. WAIVER OF COSTS
Section 15-712 of the D.C. Code has been changed many times since it
was first enacted in 1921,200 but its basic substance has remained the same.
The 1973 version provides that:
When satisfactory evidence is presented to the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia or one of the judges thereof that the
plaintiff in a suit is indigent and unable to make deposit of costs,
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. V 1975). This statute authorizes, for the first time, the
attachment of government employees' salaries, military pay, and federal retirement pay-
ments under the existing procedures for child and spousal support enforcement orders cre-
ated by local state law.
197. See Employees' Garnishment Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-14 (July 26, 1977). This Act
provides in part:
[w]ages, salaries, annuities, retirement and disability benefits, and other remunera-
tion based upon employment, that are owed by, due from, and payable by the
government of the District of Columbia to any individual shall be subject to at-
tachment and garnishment provided the levy is predicated upon the entry of a
judgment, order, or decree determining the individual's legal obligation to provide
child support or to make maintenance or alimony payments.
Notably, the MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 5B(b) (1977 Cum. Supp.) has also been amended to
allow the court to "order a lien on the earnings of the defaulting party, due or to be due, in
an amount sufficient to pay the support ordered by the court." Under this provision, the
term "employer" includes "any public entity."
198. D.C. Code § 16-911 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 108(e) (1977).
199. D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. REL. R. 403 (amending D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. REL. R. 11
(1956)).
200. Act of Mar. 3, 1921, ch. 125, § 8, 41 Stat. 1311.
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the court or judge may permit the prosecution of the suit without
the prepayment or deposit of costs.20 '
The purpose, scope, and application of this section was explained by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Harris v.
Harris. 202 Harris involved two appellants who petitioned informapauperis
to be relieved from the prepayment of costs required in their actions for
divorce. The appellants based their petitions on section 15-712. The trial
court denied both petitions on a number of grounds, including the public
policy of encouraging the preservation of marriage and the "permanency
of the family relationship. ' 203 The court was apprehensive that the grant
of such petitions in divorce cases, as opposed to matters of mere custody or
support, would be tantamount to stamping a judicial seal of approval on
the attorney's role of home breaker. 2°4 In reversing the denial, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia assumed that the two
appellants were, in fact, indigent for the purpose of section 15-712205 and
that the trial court's denial had effectively barred them from proceeding
with their divorce suits. The court then discussed the purpose of the indi-
gency statute:
The obvious intent of the indigency statute is to make avail-
able to the indigent, in common with his fellow citizen, the full
range of civil remedies contrived by court or legislature including
what appear to be meritorious cases for divorce. . . .Congress
has enacted a statute authorizing divorce on prescribed grounds
and, where the facts indicate that a party is entitled to a divorce
on the basis of one of these grounds, additional inquiries are not
warranted . . . .[T]he informapauperis statute should be con-
strued to permit indigents to proceed in good faith with nonfrivo-
lous claims for divorce. 2°6
The court noted that the lower court's public policy concerns could not be
imposed as an additional requirement under the divorce statute. The court
201. D.C. Code § 15-712 (1973).
202. 137 U.S. App. D.C. 318, 424 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
203. 137 U.S. App. D.C. at 322, 424 F.2d at 810.
204. See 137 U.S. App. D.C. at 322-23, 424 F.2d at 810-11. The court drew attention to
the practice of the Legal Aid Society to petition for leave to proceed informapauperis only
in support and custody matters. It was asserted that seeking a waiver of court costs in di-
vorce actions was "demeaning" to the bar since it put attorneys in the position of attempting
to destroy families and stir up litigation for that purpose. Id.
205. Adkins v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948), was cited as provid-
ing the proper test for determining whether a party is eligible to proceed informapauperis
under the federal statute. The court indicated that under the D.C. Code, a petitioner need
not be on welfare or "absolutely destitute" in order to qualify. 137 U.S. App. D.C. at 322,
424 F.2d at 810.
206. 137 U.S. App. D.C. at 322-23, 424 F.2d at 810-11.
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held that the ability to pay court costs would not be made a condition
precedent to obtaining a divorce. In sum, the informapauperis statute did
not exclude actions for divorce. 20 7 The court concluded by interpreting
section 15-712 to apply to all court costs, except for publication costs, since
they were paid to the newspapers and not the court.20 8
While it has been held that transcript fees cannot be waived, 209 more
recent decisions have allowed parties proceeding in forma pauperis to
waive these costs as well. In Lee v. Habib,21° the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that "the United States
must pay for transcripts for indigent litigants allowed to appeal informa
pauperis to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals if the trial judge or a
judge of the [District of Columbia Court of Appeals] certifies that the ap-
peal raises a substantial question the resolution of which requires a tran-
script."'211 The opinion surveyed recent equal protection cases in the
criminal law area 212 and concluded that the underlying principles found
therein were equally applicable to civil cases, since the criminal cases had
focused on deficient procedures whereby wealthy litigants received more
careful consideration of their appeals than their indigent counterparts. 213
Two statutes were applied to impose the free transcript requirement in this
jurisdiction: section 753, which sets forth a litigant's eligibility for a free
transcript in federal district court,214 and section 11-935, which imposes an
obligation on the court "to equate the 'rules, practice, and procedure' relat-
ing to fees for transcripts in the Court of General Sessions [now Superior
Court] as nearly as practicable to those in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. ' 21 5 The court determined that the two stat-
207. 137 U.S. App. D.C. at 323,424 F.2d at 811. As an example of the additional require-
ments imposed by the lower court's scrutiny of public policy, the court of appeals pointed
out that nonindigent plaintiffs were not required to go beyond the statutory divorce grounds
and make a showing that some useful social purpose would be served by the termination of
their marriage. 137 U.S. App. D.C. at 324, 424 F.2d at 812.
208. 137 U.S. App. D.C. at 325, 424 F.2d at 813. In view of the $100.00 minimum fee
deposit for appointed counsel required by D.C. Code § 16-918, the court called for such
attorneys to serve without compensation in informapauperis cases. 137 U.S. App. D.C. at
324-25, 424 F.2d at 812-13.
209. See Estabrook v. Otis, 18 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1927).
210. 137 U.S. App. D.C. 403, 424 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
211. 137 U.S. App. D.C. at 416, 424 F.2d at 904.
212. 137 U.S. App. D.C. at 410-11, 424 F.2d at 898-99. The court cited the following
cases among others: Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (states must provide counsel
for indigent defendants on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (transcript fee
resulting in practical unavailability of transcripts to poor on appeal amounts to denial of
equal protection).
213. 137 U.S. App. D.C. at 413-14, 424 F.2d at 901-02.
214. 28 U.S.C. § 753(0 (1976).
215. 137 U.S. App. D.C. at 415, 424 F.2d at 903 (citing D.C. Code § 11-935 (1967)).
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utes, construed together, provided the right to a free transcript on appeal
from the Superior Court in a limited class of civil cases.216 This view is
consistent with the underlying purpose of section 15-712, which is to make
the full range of civil remedies provided by the court and the legislature
available to the indigent.217
The 1977 modifications continue the liberalizing trend established in
the case law in this area. The first paragraph of section 15-712 now pro-
vides that:
Any District of Columbia court may authorize the commence-
ment, prosecution or defense of any non-criminal suit, action or
proceeding, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and
costs or security therefor, including the fees for transcripts on ap-
peal, by a person who is unable to pay such costs or give security
therefore without substantial hardship to himself or herself or his
or her family, as established by affidavit or other proof satisfac-
tory to the court.218
This amendment codifies the court's reasoning in Lee v. Habib.219 It ac-
knowledges the equal protection rights of litigants in civil cases and makes
the benefits of section 15-712 expressly available to parties in all types of
civil cases, thus precluding the need for the case by case approach of Har-
ris v. Harris,220 which could well have been construed as applying solely to
plaintiffs in informapauperis divorce proceedings. Additionally, the stat-
ute broadens section 15-712 to include transcript fees on appeal. Again,
this incorporates the holding of Lee v. Habib into the express language of
the code. Presumably, the limiting boundaries of Lee will be superimposed
upon the new law since they are not addressed directly by the legislation
216. 137 U.S. App. D.C. at 415-16, 424 F.2d at 903-04. This dual construction had previ-
ously been undertaken in the earlier case of Tate v. United States, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 261,
359 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1966), in which it was held that these same statutes required free
transcripts for indigents in criminal cases which were appealed from the court of general
sessions. Thus, the court again applied the mandate of a criminal equal protection case to a
civil case.
217. See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 318, 322-23, 424 F.2d 806, 810-11
(D.C. Cir. 1970). In Cabillo v. Cabillo, 317 A.2d 866 (D.C. 1974), the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals applied Harris in light of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), see
note 161 supra and held that the denial of a petition to proceed informa pauperis when
petitioner's income slightly exceeded the welfare standard, in an action for divorce or annul-
ment, deprived appellants not only of their statutory right under § 15-712, but also their due
process rights under the Constitution.
Although Harris did not extend the effect of § 15-712 to publication costs, this obstacle
has been substantially removed for the indigent by the 1977 amendment of § 13-340 which
allows posting in lieu of publication. See text accompanying note 163 supra.
218. D.C. Code § 15-712 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 202(a) (1977).
219. 137 U.S. App. D.C. 403, 424 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
220. 137 U.S. App. D.C. 318, 424 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 27:469
The 1977 Marriage and Divorce Act
and do not clash with its intent.221 Finally, this new section enunciates a
"substantial hardship" standard which should give the courts a measure of
flexibility in granting petitions to proceed under section 15-712.222 A sec-
ond paragraph has also been added to make it easier for recipients of
assistance to show their eligibility to proceed in forma pauperis. Anyone
receiving Aid to Families with Dependant Children, General Public
Assistance, or Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security
Act is presumed eligible to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs
or security therefor. 223
X. THE ELIMINATION OF TORT ACTIONS
The District of Columbia has now become the last jurisdiction in the
metropolitan area to eliminate the tort actions for breach of promise and
alienation of affections. Actions for criminal conversation have also now
been eliminated in the District and Virginia, although they continue to
exist in Maryland.224 The tort action for breach of promise to marry has
existed in Anglo-American law for three hundred years.225 It is based upon
the detriment or harm suffered in reliance upon a false promise. As early
as the mid-1930's criticisms of this cause of action led to enactment in
various states of legislation known popularly as "heart-balm acts" which
abolished breach of promise actions. Nevertheless, many plaintiffs have
attempted to circumvent the statute by suing under other labels such as
deceit and fraud.226 We shall not attempt to examine this subject in depth
since it could well justify a separate law review article, but should point
out the existence of extensive litigation arising in other jurisdictions as a
result of their abolition of actions for breach of promise. 227
221. The court placed two limitations on its holding. First, there is no right to a free
transcript whose resolution requires a transcript when the appeal does not raise a substantial
question. 424 F.2d at 904. Second, even if a transcript is found necessary, Lee does not
require the government to furnish a complete transcript. Id. at 904 n.59.
222. See note 205 supra.
223. D.C. Code § 15-712 (1973), as amended by D.C. Law 1-107, § 202(b) (1977).
224. The 1977 Act added § 16-923 to the Code, which abolishes these causes of action.
D.C. Law 1-107, § 111 (1977). See also MD. CODE ANN. art. 5, § 301 (1975); VA. CODE
§ 8.01-220 (1975).
225. See H. CLARK, supra note 20, at 1.
226. See, e.g., A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1940), afJ'd, 123 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 691 (1941); Thibault v. Lalumiere, 60 N.E.2d 349 (Mass. 1945);
Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, 255 App. Div. 103, 6 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1938).
227. See, e.g., Stevens v. Lang, 99 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Boyd v. Boyd, 228 Cal.
App. 2d 374, 39 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1964); Langdon v. Sayre, 74 Cal. App. 2d 41, 168 P.2d 57
(1946); Bunten v. Bunten, 192 A. 727 (N.J. Misc. 1937). See also Comment, Breach of Prom-
ise to Marry, 17 BAYLOR L. REV. 51 (1965); Comment, Abolition of Breach of Promise in
Wisconsin-Scope and Constitutionality, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 341 (1959-60); Casenote, 10 ALA.
L. REV. 435 (1958); Recent Decisions, 3 VILL. L. REV. 387 (1958).
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Like the breach of promise to marry, the torts of alienation of affecta-
tions and criminal conversation were also torts which had their origins in
the English common law and which have now been abolished in most ju-
risdictions in the United States. Unlike breach of promise to marry, how-
ever, they were intended as protection for the rights of consortium and
marriage. Historically, an action for alienation of affections was brought
against a stranger who had induced or assisted the wife to leave her hus-
band, but the action did not necessarily include adultery. Conversely,
criminal conversation was a closely related action that required only proof
that sexual relations had occurred between the spouse and the defendant.
Similar to actions for breach of promise to marry, however, suits for alien-
ation of affections and criminal conversation have now been eliminated in
many American jurisdictions as a result of the increasing popular opposi-
tion to judicial interference in such matters.
XI. RETROACTIVITY
The separation period for both the six-month voluntary separation
ground and the twelve month no-fault ground can presumably be applied
retroactively under the 1977 Marriage and Divorce Act in cases filed after
April 7, 1977, the date of enactment of the statute. In Tpping v. Tpping,228
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that the District's then five-year voluntary separation ground for di-
vorce was retroactive. 229 The plaintiff in that case had sued for divorce
claiming advantage of the recently enacted five-year provision. She and
her husband had already been separated for eight years but seven years
and eleven months of that separation had transpired before the enactment
of the five-year ground. The appellate court found that there was no legis-
lative intent expressed as to retroactivity and that the statute should there-
fore be applied equally to "past and future transactions. ' 230 After citing a
number of authorities on statutory construction to support its finding,231
the court stated that a restrictive application of the Act would give rise to
incongruous and unintended results. Instead, it was resolved that the "ac-
tual status" of the parties should be given recognition, especially in light of
Congress' intent to liberalize the District's divorce laws both as to existing
and prospective conditions.232 This reasoning should apply to the changes
wrought by the new no-fault divorce grounds.233
228. 65 U.S. App. D.C. 222, 82 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
229. D.C. Code §' 16-403 (1940).
230. 65 U.S. App. D.C. at 224, 82 F.2d at 830.
231. Id.
232. 65 U.S. App. D.C. at 225, 82 F.2d at 830-31.
233. See also Parks v. Parks, 73 U.S. App. D.C. 93, 116 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1940). For
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There is, however, considerable dispute among practitioners as to the
retroactivity vel non of the 1977 law in other respects. In a case involving a
federal statute, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit has recently stated that: "'[A] court is to apply the law in
effect at the time that it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in
manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the
contrary.'"234 As an example of such "manifest" injustice, the Supreme
Court "has refused to apply an intervening change to a pending action in
which it concluded that to do so would infringe upon or deprive a person
of a right that would have matured or become conditional. ' 235 There are
also constitutionally protected rights under the due process clause of the
fifth amendment, which may not be retroactively eliminated by legisla-
tion.236 Bruce French, Staff Director and Counsel of the Committee on
Government Operations, who played a major role in the legislative proc-
ess, has expressed the view that the new divorce statute will apply to all
aspects of all new suits filed after the April 7, 1977 enactment date. French
believes, however, that the new District of Columbia Marriage and Di-
vorce Act will also be retroactive as to property matters in all pending
suits, but will not be retroactive as to grounds for divorce in suits already
pending on the date of enactment.
Prior to enactment, section 16-902 provided that: "[n]o action for di-
vorce shall be maintainable unless one of the parties has been a bona fide
resident of the District of Columbia for at least one year next preceding the
commencement of the action."237 The new Act changed this language by
substituting the words "six months" for the words "one year." Therefore, it
would appear that the applicable jurisdictional statute in a pending case
would be the statute that existed at the time of "commencement of the
action." In Clark v. Clark,238 it was held that if the court did not have
jurisdiction for lack of residence for the requisite period at the time of
"commencement" of the action, a counterclaim, and presumably a supple-
mental complaint, could not cure the jurisdictional defect, since the statu-
tory language specifies that the residence requirement must be satisfied on
the date of commencement of the action. There are no appellate decisions
cases discussing the retroactive effect of Maryland's separation grounds, see Rhoad v.
Rhoad, 21 Md. App. 147, 318 A.2d 551 (1974) and Buckheit v. Buckheit, 10 Md. App. 526,
272 A.2d 54 (1970).
234. National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822, 825 (D.C. Cir.
1977), (quoting Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)).
235. Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 720 (1974), citing Green v. U.S., 276
U.S. 149, 160 (1964)).
236. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
237. D.C. Code § 16-902 (1971) (emphasis added).
238. 79 F. Supp. 722 (D.D.C. 1939).
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on this point. If however, there were jurisdiction at the commencement of
the action, there is no reason why an amended pleading could not relate
back, and thus invoke new grounds for divorce and new property claims
based upon the law that became effective during the pendency of the ac-
tion, but prior to amendment. Leave to amend for this purpose should be
freely granted unless strong equitable considerations militate against such
an amendment in a particular case. But the objection of one party to appli-
cation of the new statutory language should not, in and of itself, be a bar to
leave to amend.
In a decision rendered on September 30, 1977, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals appeared to approve retroactivity without the need for
amendment. In Williams v. Williams,239 the court remanded the case for
failure of the court below to find precisely when a nonvoluntary separation
had become voluntary, for purposes of the prior statute's twelve-month
separation requirement. Nevertheless, the court, in a per curiam opinion,
stated that: "Insofar as pertinent, the new law reduces substantially the
requirements for a divorce based upon separation. Consequently, in the
circumstances of this case, we should think that in applying the new statute
on remand, the principal issue relating to separation should become rather
simplified, as should the proceedings. ' '24°
We do not attempt here to consider constitutional due process questions
which may be raised with respect to the consequences of retroactivity on
rights to sole property that were fixed or vested and not subject to division
in the divorce judge's discretion prior to April 7, 1977. However, we do
point out that such issues will be litigated for some time to come, and that
the answers are not obvious from either the statutory language or the legis-
lative history.
XII. THE EFFECT OF THE ANTI-SEX DISCRIMINATORY LANGUAGE ACT
ON ALIMONY AND CUSTODY
In contrast to the 1977 District of Columbia Marriage and Divorce Act
is the Anti-Sex Discriminatory Language Act of 1976.24I This Act added
the following langauge to section 16-911, which deals with temporary cus-
tody: "[Tihe court may. . . determine who shall have the care and custody
of infant children pending the proceedings, without conclusive regard to
the race, color, national origin, political affiliation, sex, or sexual orienta-
tion, in and of itself, of a party. ' 242 Similar language was appended to
239. 378 A.2d 668 (D.C. 1977).
240. Id. at 670.
241. D.C. Law 1-87 (1976).
242. D.C. Code § 16-911(4) (Supp. IV 1977).
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section 16-914, which provides that the court retains jurisdiction of custody
matters after the award is made, "[W]ith respect to matters of custody and
visitation, the race, color, national origin, political affiliation, sex, or sex-
ual orientation, in and of itself, of a party shall not be a conclusive consid-
eration. ' '243 While these new provisions are expected to have a significant
impact on future custody determinations, existing case law indicates that
the courts of this jurisdiction have already rejected sex and race as deter-
minative factors in this area. For example, in Coles v. Coles,244 a mother
appealed an award of custody to her husband. She contended, inter alia,
that she should be given custody since both she and the child were fe-
male.245 The appellate court afffrmed the award to the father, thus indicat-
ing that the sex of the parent, in and of itself, should not be conclusive in
custody determinations. Similarly, a difference in race and religion did not
prevent the adoption of a white child by a black father and a white mother.
In In re Adoption ofa Minor,246 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit stated:
Nor can denial of the adoption rest on a distinction between the
"social status" of whites and Negroes. There may be reasons why
a difference in race, or religion, may have relevance in adoption
proceedings. But that factor alone cannot be decisive in deter-
mining the child's welfare. It does not permit a court to ignore all
other relevant considerations. Here we think those other consid-
erations have controlling weight. 247
In Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals stated that "although it is recognized that children of tender years are
better off with their mothers, absent a finding that the mother is unfit, this
presumption cannot be viewed as controlling but merely as a usually per-
suasive factor relating to the issue of custody." 248 The wording of the Anti-
Sex Discriminatory Language Act does not expressly eliminate such a pre-
sumption, since subparagraph 4 of section 16-911 merely states that deter-
mination of custody shall be made "without conclusive regard to. . .sex."
This language, however, appears to make no real change in existing case
law and the courts will continue to apply the presumption that a child of
tender years is better off with the mother, subject to rebuttal by other facts.
Virginia law provides that, "in awarding the custody of the child to either
parent or to some other person, [the judge] shall give primary considera-
243. D.C. Code § 16-914 (Supp. IV 1977).
244. 204 A.2d 330 (D.C. 1964).
245. Id. at 331
246. 97 U.S. App. D.C. 99, 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
247. 97 U.S. App. D.C. at 101, 228 F.2d at 448.
248. 296 A.2d 431, 439 (D.C. 1972) (citations omitted).
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tion to the welfare of the child, and as between the parents there shall be
no presumption of law in favor of either. ' 249 As a matter of practice, Vir-
ginia courts generally ignore that statute.2 50 However, in Burnside v.
Burnside,251 the Supreme Court of Virginia considered the presumption, in
favor of the mother, but awarded custody to the father because the weight
of the evidence showed that the child's best welfare at that point required
an award of custody to the father although the mother was not unfit. As
recently as 1976, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the presumption
in favor of the mother as custodian of children of tender years "is no more
than a permissible and rebuttable inference that when the mother is fit and
other things are equal, she as the natural custodian, should have custody of
a child of tender years. ' 252 It is likely that the Anti-Sex Discriminatory
Language Act will have little more effect on District of Columbia cases
than the Virginia law has had in that jurisdiction.253
The anti-sex discrimination statute also purported to change the provi-
sions of section 16-915 of the 1973 Code, which, prior to October 1, 1976,
provided that: "In granting a divorce from the bond of marriage, the court
may restore to the wife her maiden or other previous name. '254 The new
statute has removed discretion from the court by substituting the following
mandatory language: "Upon divorce from the bond of marriage, the court
shall, on request of a party who assumed a new name on marriage and
desires to discontinue using it, state in the decree of divorce either the
birth-given or other previous name which such person desires to use."'255 It
should be noted, however, that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
interpreting the former provision in a case decided more than one year
after the new anti-sex discrimination language had been enacted, held that,
even under the prior discretionary language, it was an abuse of discretion
for the court to deny an appellant's request for restoration of her maiden
name when the only reason advanced by the trial court was that "it would
be contrary to the best interests of her two children. '256 The court com-
mented that a trial court's consideration in granting or denying a request
249. VA. CODE § 31-15 (1950).
250. See Rowlee v. Rowlee, 211 Va. 689, 179 S.E.2d 461 (1971), and cases cited therein.
251. 216 Va. 691, 222 S.E.2d 529 (1976).
252. Harper v. Harper, 217 Va. 417, 419, 229 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1976).
253. For trends in other jurisdictions, see Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 262 (1976).
On February 28, 1978, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals concluded "that since
July 1, 1973 [when the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment was enacted] the maternal pref-
erence has been abolished by statute in child custody cases." McAndrew v. McAndrew, 382
A.2d 1081 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
254. D.C. Code § 16-915 (1973).
255. D.C. Code § 16-915 (Supp. IV 1977).
256. Brown v. Brown, 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2305, 2308 (D.C. App. Nov. 21, 1977),
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for a change of name, whether under section 16-2501257 of the 1973 Code,
"is limited to consideration of those factors which limited a person's com-
mon law right to change his or her name. ' 258 The court remanded the case
and directed the lower court to restore the maiden name unless it found
"that her request was fraudulently or criminally motivated. 259
Furthermore, the anti-sex discrimination statute has the effect of "de-
sexing" certain provisions of sections 16-911 and 16-912. These provisions
empower the court to require a "husband to pay alimony to the wife for
the maintenance of herself and their minor children" pendente life and to
"decree her permanent alimony sufficient for her support and that of any
minor children who the Court assigns to her care .... -260 As amended,
section 16-911 now states, in pertinent part, that
[d]uring the pendency of an action for divorce, or an action by
the husband or wife to declare the marriage null and void, where
the nullity is denied by the other spouse, the Court may:
(1) require the husband or wife to pay alimony to the other
spouse for the maintenance of himself or herself and their minor
children .... 261
Similarly, section 16-912 has been modified to read as follows: "When a
divorce is granted to either spouse, the court may decree him or her per-
manent alimony sufficient for his or her support and that of any minor
children whom the court assigns to that spouse's care."
262
The statute obviously makes it possible now for the wife, as well as the
husband, to be required to pay alimony both temporarily and permanent-
ly. Prior to these amendments in 1976, the court had no statutory authority
to order a wife to pay alimony to her husband since the terms of the Code
made reference only to the husband. 263 Similar modifications have been
made in the statutes of Maryland 264 and Virginia. 265 Thus, the language
opinion vacated, 382 A.2d 1038 (D.C. 1978). In light of the anti-sex discrimination provision,
the Brown opinion was vacated although the judgment was allowed to stand.
257. D.C. Code § 16-2501 (1973) is the general provision for name changes.
258. 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2308.
259. Id.
260. D.C. Code §§ 16-911, 16-912 (1973).
261. D.C. Code § 16-911(a) (Supp. IV 1977) (emphasis added).
262. D.C. Code § 16-912 (Supp. IV 1977) (emphasis added).
263. Even prior to this change, however, a wife could be required to contribute to the
support of her children. Before 1970, the District followed the common law rule of imposing
the primary duty on the father, but since the enactment of the 1970 amendment to D.C.
Code § 16-916(C), the trial court has had discretion to require that either or both spouses
contribute to the support of minor children. See Farmer v. Midgley, 102 DAILY WASH. L.
REP. 177 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973). See also McKay v. Paulson, 211 Md. 90, 126 A.2d 296
(1956) for the history of a similar Maryland provision.
264. MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 5A (1973).
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change results not only in unanimity among the three contiguous jurisdic-
tions but significantly broadens the court's authority to award alimony.266
XIII. CONCLUSION
The 1977 amendments constitute the culmination of a forty-two year
trend toward liberalization of grounds for divorce in the District of Co-
lumbia, and follow the recent and rapid trend throughout the United
States toward simple and accessible no-fault divorces. 267 Nevertheless, it is
anomalous that the District has retained adultery as a ground for legal
separation, but not for absolute divorce. This distinction does not have a
rational basis, and, as a result, adultery will rarely be used as a ground for
divorce since the no-fault or voluntary separation grounds for absolute di-
vorce are likely in most cases to be available before a plaintiff in an adul-
tery action can get to trial.
Clearly, no-fault divorce based on separation for one year without co-
habitation makes a real change in substance and practice, which, along
with the shortening of the voluntary separation period to six months will
make a District of Columbia divorce more easily and quickly obtainable.
There will no longer be an incentive to move to a contiguous jurisdiction
to accelerate the date at which a final divorce may be obtained. It is also
265. VA. CODE § 20-107 (1975).
266. The disparity among the three neighboring jurisdictions may, however, continue to
play a role with respect to property considerations since both Virginia and Maryland divide
joint property equally, and in neither jurisdiction can the divorce court divide property titled
solely in the name of one spouse.
On January 5, 1978, the Maryland Governor's Commission on Domestic Relations Law,
chaired by Beverly Anne Groner, approved a proposal now pending in the Maryland legis-
lature, reportedly with substantial support, that would establish a concept of "marital prop-
erty" consisting of all property acquired by the parties during their marriage. The proposal
would give the court, in divorce and annulment cases, the power to consider the total value
of "marital property" in the disposition of the property of the parties, including the recogni-
tion that special consideration from a family point of view needs to be given to real property
constituting the family home and personal property devoted primarily to family use. It also
recognizes the need to consider non-monetary as well as monetary contributions of the par-
ties to the marriage. Although the approach is somewhat different, if adopted, the proposal
would make changes similar to those effected by the District of Columbia Marriage and
Divorce Act on April 4, 1977, with respect to the power of the D.C. Superior Court over
property acquired during the marriage.
267. According to Doris Jonas Freed, Chairperson of the Committee on Research, Fam-
ily Law Section, American Bar Association, and Henry H. Foster, Jr., her predecessor:
As of August 1, 1977, only three American jurisdictions still retain the old 'fault
only' grounds for divorce: Illinois, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. Reform is in
the wind in these states, however. There are now 31 states with the irretrievable
breakdown ground. In some 15, it is the sole ground; in the remaining 16, it has
been added to the traditional fault grounds.
3 FAM. L. REP. 4048 (BNA) (1977).
The 1977 Marriage and Divorce Act
now possible for a court to award a lump sum or other property award in
lieu of alimony.
Unfortunately, it appears that the effort to eliminate the mandatory ap-
pointment of counsel in uncontested cases has not been entirely successful
and has certainly failed to simplify the divorce proceedings. 268 It is simi-
larly apparent that the Council neglected to deal effectively with the retro-
activity question. The statute provides little guidance and a significant
amount of litigation is likely to result in this area.
The Council specifically enumerated the criteria to be considered in
custody and property distribution determinations. We believe, as did the
bar groups, that these criteria should have been omitted in order to give
more flexibility to the courts in the future in adapting the relevant factors
to reflect the changing values in society. Nevertheless, it is clear that
neither the custody nor property-distribution criteria add anything signif-
icantly new to the law, and, at this point, serve as nothing more than a
codification of the principles developed in the case law. These changes will
have little practical effect on either custody or property division cases.
In sum, we are left to conclude that the overall effect of the new law has
been to affirm the federal and local courts of the District of Columbia.
268. As this article went to press, there was pending before the Council of the District of
Columbia a new bill (2-202) which, if adopted, would create a "presumption that a disinter-
ested attorney shall not be appointed . . . in all cases in which personal service . . . is
effected and . . . defendant fails to indicate any intention to contest .. " It would also
establish criteria for appointment of counsel on other cases. The Family Law Division of the
District of Columbia Bar and the Domestic Relations Committee of the Bar Association of
the District of Columbia unanimously approved at a joint meeting their committees' action
and recommended a revision of Court rules to effectuate the purposes of Bill 202 to obviate
the necessity for Council action. See also notes 180-181 & accompanying text supra
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